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ABSTRACT1

Presley, Steven, Scott, Ph.D., University of South Alabama, May 2022. Effective
Cybersecurity Risk Management in Projects. Chair of Committee: Jeffrey, Landry, Ph.D.
Project meta-phases describe the life stages in which project and sponsoring
organizations are exposed to cybersecurity risk. Three hypotheses were formulated to
examine whether cybersecurity risk was evident in each of three project meta-phases.
Project assets for a typical information systems project were identified and associated
with each project meta-phase. Whitman’s Threat, Vulnerability and Asset (TVA) risk
management process was used to create project threat scenarios, which formed the basis
of a risk assessment questionnaire. An online tool was used to administer the survey to 66
project and/or cybersecurity professionals. Participants were asked to rate each scenario’s
probability of occurrence and potential consequences. ISRAM methodology was used to
aggregate responses and estimate resultant risk categories. Both one sample and paired
sample t-tests were conducted to examine the meaningfulness of risk in each threat
scenario. All three hypotheses, each corresponding to the presence of risk in one of the
three project meta-phases, were supported by the sample data analysis.

1

Versions of some sections of this manuscript has been published at the Americas Conference on Information Systems (Presley,
Landry, and Shropshire, 2018a; Presley, Landry, and Shropshire, 2020) and the Southern Association for Information Systems
Conference (Presley and Landry, 2016, Presley and Landry, 2018b).

xii

The study is intended to support the broader question of what, for projects,
constitutes effective cybersecurity risk management, such as early cybersecurity risk
identification and ongoing management throughout the project life stages. This effort also
seeks to contribute to the academic study of project risk management and cybersecurity
management and provide a practical method for prioritizing and managing project
cybersecurity risk.

xiii

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Motivation
Since the early 1960s, the world has been transformed by the proliferation of
computing systems. As the technology for information processing became cheaper,
increasingly powerful, and ubiquitous, the most sensitive and vital information related to
human endeavors shifted from the printed page and written words using ink and paper to
electrons in vacuum tubes and transistors, magnetic media, and ultimately, the Internet.
Along with this transformation came many challenges.
A prominent security researcher, Eugene Spafford, suggests that the evolution of
Von Neuman architecture, the ubiquitous basis of current computing technology, has
over many years created a computing environment that is very difficult to secure
(Spafford, 2017). Modern operating systems, for example, have their foundations in code
created many years ago before potential vulnerabilities were well understood.
Furthermore, the longevity of these codebases was not fully considered when originally
written.
Due to time and budget issues, and the sheer volume of code that is present in
each of the increasingly complex layers of solution stacks and the large numbers of
interdependencies between layers, most software providers are unable to fully audit all
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the code upon which their solutions rely. Starting over is not an option either, because of
the sheer volume of interdependent legacy commercial software residing in the lower
levels of the stack on which they are built. Regression testing is expensive for most
companies, and time-to-market and cost pressures inhibit thorough testing (Spafford,
2017).
The factors of cost, volume, and time to market have led to the current situation
where legacy code is still in use that was not designed to withstand modern attack
methods. As a result, malicious actors continuously discover and use a wide variety of
exploits, with IT companies struggling to issue patches to address these vulnerabilities
(Spafford, 2017). Once the patches have been released, companies using the software
have the challenge of ongoing monitoring and deployment. One solution would be
rewriting the legacy portions of the new software to modern security standards, but
Spafford notes that due to the amount of code (tens of millions of lines in some cases) the
expense of such an effort is a major barrier.
In short, nearly every organization is exposed to cybersecurity risk to some degree
- any given product, activity, or service is likely to be dependent upon an information
system. At least one expert believes there exists a systemic and persistent condition in
current information systems technology where security has been an afterthought and is
often deprioritized (Spafford, 2017). It follows that every organization may need to
consider its exposure to cybersecurity risk in light of the current IS environment. For
example, threats to critical infrastructure have resulted in the US Government passing
legislation including the Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014 (NIST, 2018).
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Organizations take various approaches to address cybersecurity risk which range
along a spectrum from full acceptance to an active ongoing risk management program.
The risk management approach has been supported by prior research (Pardue et al.,
2011), practitioner recommendations (PMI, 2013; PMI, 2017a), and government
directives (US DoD, 2015a). An active risk management approach involves identifying
potential risks, analyzing the likelihood of a risk occurring, estimating the expected
impacts should the risk occur, and then taking appropriate actions to protect the
organization’s assets and operations. Projects can be conceptualized as an encapsulation
of both assets and processes that often are of strategic importance to an organization. The
project itself is a collection of activities, which require organizational assets and
resources to function (PMI, 2017a).
During the time that computing technology was transforming society, project
management began to be recognized as a profession and field of study around the mid1900s (Hanisch & Walde, 2011; PMI, 2017a). Organizations began to understand the
value of organizing workgroups tasked with producing specific outcomes around
temporary projects (Midler, 1995). These project teams exist in parallel with, and
sometimes outside of, pre-existing organizational models.
Whereas traditional organizations are structured into departments that are
organized around specialized functions within the organization, project teams bring
members from multiple departments together to speed communication, feedback, and
decision making, and thereby reduce the time and cost of innovation. Improved agility
and cross-disciplinary communications are two advantages provided by temporary
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projects, which proved to be important for organizations that were seeking to rapidly
introduce innovative products and serve market niches at a lower cost (Midler, 1995).
Market demand for rapid innovations has led to this proliferation of temporary
project teams, which has been referred to as projectification (Midler, 1995). Driven by
the recognition of project management as an important component of the business
landscape, the formation of the International Project Management Association in 1965
and the Project Management Institute (PMI) in 1969 were major milestones in the study
of the concepts and practices of project management. These groups began to catalog the
unique challenges and methods needed for the effective management of project teams.
The interest in project management as a discipline has grown since then, and the PMI
Project Management Body of Knowledge, first published in 1987, has just seen its sixth
revision published in 2017 (Haughey, 2010; PMI, 2017a).
Many new innovative products and services are now created by project teams
(PMI, 2017a). These teams often exist outside of pre-existing organizational reporting
structures, are organized around specific goals and objectives, and are intended to be
temporary, lasting only as long as needed to reach the specific goals of the project.
Therefore, projects have generally been described as temporary organizations (Midler,
1995).
Innovations often carry risks, because, by definition, an innovation represents
something new to the organization, whether it be a new product, a new process, or a new
information system. It follows that the organization’s existing risk management processes
may need to be adjusted to account for the innovation.
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This effort proposes that the potential for misuse or compromise of these
innovations and the projects that create them, referred to hereafter as project
cybersecurity risk, is a concern to the public and private sectors (Hendershot, 2014; US
DoD, 2015c). The reason for the concern is simple. Cybersecurity threats are likely to
occur. New threats are identified daily, and any project which uses information
technology as part of the project processes, or as part of the service or product the project
produces, is very likely to be exposed to cybersecurity risks. In addition to being likely,
realized cybersecurity risks in the form of major breaches have dramatic negative
financial, public relations, and even lasting political impacts (Basu, 2015).
It is reasonable then to consider how cybersecurity risk is being addressed within
the context of temporary projects, and furthermore, how these practices align with the
standards and practices of the permanent parent organizations and the cybersecurity
community at large.
It is uncertain whether project managers are fully aware of the risks that
cybersecurity threats pose to their projects or perceive that they have a role in managing
this risk, even though risk management has been recognized as an important part of the
project management body of knowledge. Cybersecurity is not mentioned specifically in a
recent release of the PMI Project Management Body of Knowledge, which is a widely
used framework that is based on a review process with hundreds of project management
practitioners (PMI, 2017a). Still, project risk management is a major section within the
framework. In a presentation to university faculty and students, the Chief Information
Officer of the State of Alabama recognized the threats and related risks posed by
cybersecurity. One approach they are considering is to embed cybersecurity experts in
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each project team (Hale, 2016) which is described as an important, iterative, and ongoing
process, (PMI, 2017a). Cybersecurity risk is increasingly seen as a significant portion of
overall project risk (Hendershot, 2014; US DoD, 2015a).
Project cybersecurity thus involves the management of cybersecurity-related risks
within the context of a project. Such risks are relevant for the protection of project assets.
Managing cybersecurity risks involves challenges that require additional effort beyond
the management of more traditional project risks.
To summarize, the following definition, suggested by the dissertation chair and
co-author, captures the key elements of the phenomenon described above:
Project cybersecurity is taking precautions to protect an extended organization’s
valuable project and cyber assets against present and future harm due to threats incurred
during a project's extended lifespan from inception through closeout.

1.2 The Phenomenon
The phenomenon of this research effort is, therefore, the management of
cybersecurity risk in the context of projects. Using the broadest definition, risk may be
understood as a function of the probability of adverse cybersecurity events and the impact
of these events on project assets. These impacts can extend far beyond project closeout.
For example, cyber events can affect not only assets internal to the project but also the
security of external project stakeholders such as consumers of the goods and services
which are developed because of the project. Impacts can also affect external
organizations (e.g., customers, supply chain members, and third-party contractors). In
cases where project deliverables are critical to infrastructure or national defense interests,
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realized cybersecurity risks could impact entire nations in the most sensitive examples
such as vital infrastructure (Miller, 2017). Numerous and ongoing studies have repeatedly
shown massive economic impact well into the trillions of US dollars (Ponemon Institute,
2015; Bissell et al., 2019).

1.2.1 Description of the Phenomenon
The term cybersecurity in the context of an activity carried out by an organization
is often thought of as “measures taken to protect a computer or computer system (as on
the Internet) against unauthorized access or attack” (Merriam-Webster, n.d.) This
definition is, however, too narrow because it doesn’t include all common sources of risk
to project-related information assets (data, systems, and tools) which could affect a
project or its deliverables. This research effort adopts a broader view similar to the
definition proposed in a United States Department of Defense memo (Cartwright, 2010),
which includes everything an organization does to protect against all dangers and risks to
the organization’s information assets. Such risks could include natural disasters,
accidental or deliberate data loss, unauthorized modifications, as well as deliberate
attacks.
1.2.2 Public Awareness of the Phenomenon
Cybersecurity concerns have been part of the national political landscape for
several years. For example, a detailed policy statement was issued by the office of U.S.
President Barak Obama under his signature in 2011 (POTUS, 2011). Just as cybersecurity
policy and research continue to be an important topic in the public sector, recent attacks
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have raised the level of visibility to the private sector and are also routinely reported by
public news media outlets (Perez & Wallace, 2014; Rushe, 2015).
In the same timeframe when information systems were becoming ubiquitous
along with the accompanying challenges of protecting them, modern project
management, both in concept and practice, was also maturing and coalescing into its
current state. While project management practices have been around since ancient times
(Kozak-Holland & Procter,2014; PMI, 2017a), the study and codification of project
management knowledge and practices have accelerated, with several important
milestones from the early 1900s to the present day. Key milestones in this development
of project management as a discipline included the creation of the Gantt chart technique
in 1917, the Hoover Dam project in 1931, the foundation of the Project Management
Institute in 1965, and the first publication of the PMI Project Management Body of
Knowledge in 1987 (Haughey, 2010). Prior research has also studied the movement away
from the functional organizational structures that dominated in the 1960s and 1970s
towards more empowered project teams in the 1980s and 1990s (Midler, 1995; Maylor et
al., 2006). A widely cited case study examined the motivations for this transition for a
large automaker and cataloged the processes involved in moving from a classical
function-based organization structure to one more oriented towards project teams
(Midler, 1995).
Projects and the need for cybersecurity are common themes in professional and
academic literature. The literature supports the existence of cybersecurity risks within the
context of projects. Professional and government guidelines recognize the convergence of
cybersecurity and project management and delineate a need for organizations to perform
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ongoing efforts to manage this risk in projects and programs (US DoD, 2013;
Hendershot, 2014; US DoD, 2014; US DoD, 2015a; US DoD, 2015b). Therefore, this
research effort seeks to understand how project management organizations and internal
stakeholders are addressing cybersecurity risks within the context of their projects. In
doing so, this study seeks to provide insight into the phenomenon of project cybersecurity
risk management.

1.3 The Research Question
The research question posed by this study is, therefore,
When in the lifespan of the project does cybersecurity risk become meaningful?

1.4 Expected Contribution
This dissertation seeks to examine the nature of the cybersecurity risks present
during a project’s extended lifespan. One expected contribution of this study is the
identification of both project cyber-assets and project cybersecurity threats that pertain to
various stages of the project lifespan under investigation. Such a set of assets and threats
may be validated and organized into a useful project risk register.
Once completed, this risk register may serve as a starting point for both individual
project teams and parent organizations to use as a starting point, or strawman, in
performing a more detailed risk analysis of specific projects and project assets. In this
manner, the risk register may serve to illuminate potential risks and assets that teams
might otherwise overlook. Once identified, controls can be selected to reduce overall
exposure to cybersecurity risk.
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Ultimately it is expected that these improvements in overall risk management
practices will serve the individuals and organizations in the private and public sectors
which are increasingly demanding the providers of services and products with
information technology to protect these assets against cyber threats. (Hendershot, 2014;
US DoD, 2014; US DoD, 2015a)
This assessment may also uncover gaps in current cybersecurity risk management
practices and provide specific risk characteristic recommendations to practitioners and
host organizations to consider. The findings of the research and validation effort suggest
that project teams would benefit from starting the risk management processes earlier and
implementing effective and compliant risk management efforts that better protect the
project execution processes, the project team participants and stakeholders, hosting
organization interests, and project deliverables.
This study may provide both the motivation and guidance for further research into
optimal methods of identifying and managing risks related to cybersecurity in the context
of project management. It is also expected to add insight into how cybersecurity research
into specific threats can be integrated into the overall risk management plan of projects.

1.5 Organization of the Dissertation
This dissertation is organized into six chapters. Chapter I, this chapter, serves as
the introduction to the phenomenon and research question.
Chapter II presents a review of project management literature, especially as it
relates to risk management practices and cybersecurity. Chapter II also contains a
summary of the current cybersecurity literature, such as the sources of potential
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cybersecurity risks that are likely to affect current and future projects. These risks are
organized into a threat model, which will be used to drive measures of cybersecurity
awareness and risk management effectiveness. The Threat Vulnerability Analysis
methodology is considered alongside the Facilitated Risk Analysis Process as potential
methods.
Chapter III discusses the conceptual model of project management research, a
proposed framework for analyzing and semi-qualitatively measuring cybersecurity risks
within projects, and the research model. Chapter IV presents the research methodology,
along with instruments for measuring each variable.
Chapter V presents the data analysis, and Chapter VI presents the conclusions of
the study and suggested directions for future research.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter presents a review of literature related to the phenomenon of
cybersecurity risk in the context of projects. First, the chapter reviews relevant concepts
and terminology of project risk management and cybersecurity risks. Projects are a
widely used organizational structure, which is different from the hierarchical
organizational structure, which was prevalent during the first half of the twentieth
century. The project organizational model presents both challenges and benefits to
organizations.
Project management as a discipline is described in this chapter, and in particular
the area of project risk management. Risk management is recognized as a critical function
of project management, and this chapter describes how risks can affect both the
operations and products (also called deliverables) that a project produces. Projects have a
temporal domain, and this chapter presents a method of parsimoniously describing a
project's extended lifespan using project meta-phases. Consideration of project metaphases is important because recent literature recommends beginning risk management
processes as early in the project’s lifespan as possible (PMI, 2013; US DoD, 2015a)
In the second section of this chapter, we consider cybersecurity risks that are
present in the environment in which modern projects are conducted. Cybersecurity risk
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has become an important consideration for projects that seek to produce technological
innovations, projects with a significant reliance on information technology, and projects
whose aim is to produce or improve information systems. As background, common
definitions are offered, along with an overview of how other researchers have
ontologically organized a wide variety of potential threats. A cybersecurity risk
assessment process that evaluates assets, threats, and vulnerabilities (TVA) is presented.
Finally, a synthesis combining the temporal view of project lifespans using
project meta-phases and the TVA risk assessment methodology (Whitman & Mattord,
2010) is presented. This synthesis will form the basis for Chapters III and IV.

2.1 Project Management
Project management is a fundamental organizational model that is widely used in
modern societies. As mass-production became the norm and products became cheap and
commoditized, many companies sought to find ways to differentiate their products and
services to provide a competitive advantage. This differentiation took two forms – “mass
customization,” where a wide range of different products was offered to appeal to diverse
market segments, and true product innovations, in which companies rapidly sought to
create new products and features and bring them to market quickly (Midler, 1995)

2.1.1 Development of Modern Project Management
During the industrial revolution and into the 1960s, many organizations were
organized by functional departments (Clark & Wheelwright., 1992; Giard & Midler,
1993; Midler, 1995). While providing an intuitive organizational structure with
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separation of responsibilities and controls, researchers observed that these types of
structures also led to communication inefficiencies and delays. Companies seeking to
reduce communication times, increase innovations and reduce development times of new
products began to use project teams with members drawn from many different
departments (Midler, 1995).
Because of the advantages of reducing development time and improving team
communications, project management is a fundamental organizational model in use
today, especially in the creation of innovations. The project structure was found to be
effective for creating innovations and “mass customization” (Midler, 1995).
The concept of projects and project management has been studied for several
decades as a unique field with specific characteristics. In industry, for example,
professional groups have arisen to study the topic and promote project management as a
distinct profession (PMI, 2017a). Founded in 1968, the Project Management Institute
formally collects and ontologically describes the body of knowledge related to project
management “good practices.” It then subjects these practices to extensive professional
peer-review processes and then publishes the results as the Project Management Body of
Knowledge, or PMBOK for short, along with other practitioner-oriented literature (PMI,
2009; PMI, 2016; PMI, 2017a; PMI, 2017b).
Project management has also attracted considerable interest from academic
researchers. Academic organizations and conferences in the Information Systems field
include project management as research tracks and special interest groups. Researchers
have called for theory-based project management academic research (Hanisch & Wald,
2011), which this study seeks to provide.
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While the use of projects as an organizational paradigm has many benefits, this
study considers whether the use of projects might also be problematic when considering
centrally managed efforts such as cybersecurity risk management. The potential concerns
are twofold: first, are the project teams sufficiently aware of the parent organization’s
practices and standards regarding cybersecurity risk; and second, are the organization’s
cybersecurity teams familiar enough with the project team’s activities to determine if any
of those activities pose a potential risk to the parent organization.
There is a need for the scholarly study of threats to project actors, activities,
artifacts, the assets used by the project teams, and the overall impact of a project’s
outputs or deliverables on cybersecurity risk. To get a comprehensive view, it is
necessary to consider the periods from the very first project planning discussions through
the end use of the project deliverables. This study uses the concept of project meta-phases
to provide this broader lens, as described in 2.1.4 The Three Meta-Phases of Projects.
2.1.2 Project Management Research Framework
Hanisch and Wald (2011) proposed the following research framework, to support
and encourage additional theory-based research in the field of project management. The
framework they propose appears in Figure 1.
This study proposes to operate in all three dimensions. Prior research has shown
how the design dimension (D) is important regarding the activities which occur during
the project conception meta-phase. The context dimension (C) is reflected in two aspects
– the context of the parent organization as well as the larger environment, which provides
the context of widespread cybersecurity risks and ever-changing uncertainty about what
new risks a project may face. The goal dimension (G) is relevant to the deliverable use
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meta-phase, in that the consequences of the project are reflective of whether the project
achieves overall goals. Increasingly, cybersecurity is a key goal of projects involving
information technology (US DoD, 2015a; US DoD, 2015b; Halvorsen and Kendall, 2015)

Figure 1. Hanisch and Wald’s (2011) project management research framework used to
guide the research effort.

2.1.3 Project Risk Management
Risk management is recognized as a major component of project management. In
the fifth edition of the PMI Project Management Body of Knowledge, Risk Management
is one of the ten key knowledge areas that are vital for project success (PMI, 2013). It is
described as a multi-staged ongoing effort with the goal of identifying and controlling
project risks. The risk management process begins at project inception and consists of the
following six major processes in the PMI Project Risk Management model (PMI, 2013)
in Section 11:


Sec 11.1. Plan Risk Management – defines the process that will be used for
managing risk in the project
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Sec 11.2. Identify Risks – determine which risks may affect the project and their
characteristics



Sec 11.3. Perform Qualitative Risk Analysis – assessing the probability of
occurrence and impact at a high level, and prioritizing the potential risks for further
analysis



Sec 11.4. Perform Quantitative Risk Analysis – Numeric analysis of the potential
effect of identified risks



Sec 11.5. Plan Risk Responses – develop options and actions to enhance
opportunities and reduce threats to project objectives



Sec 11.6. Control Risks - implement risk response plans, track identified risks,
monitor residual risks, identify new risks, and evaluate risk process effectiveness
throughout the process.
In this process, risks are systematically identified, analyzed, and controlled

according to the needs of the project stakeholders. This approach can be applied to a wide
variety of risks to a project’s execution as well as project deliverables. Risks are inherent
in any project and represent threats to not only project resources, but also the project
processes.
The PMI Model Section 3 describes two overarching processes present in every
project (PMI, 2013). Project management processes ensure the effective execution of the
project throughout each of the phases of the project lifecycle. Product-oriented processes
specify and create a project’s product, which can be a process, an actual product, or a
service. PMI states that the two processes are intertwined (PMI, 2013). It seems
reasonable that any project with potential exposure to cybersecurity risk should integrate
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cybersecurity risk management as part of the project management processes and productoriented processes.
The recommended best practices for managing risks in general at the project level
involve a proactive risk analysis approach that starts as early as possible in the project
lifespan. In each of these processes, effective risk management is considered a necessary
component (PMI, 2013). The concept of early risk management is also consistent with
recent directives from the US Department of Defense, which have mandated a lifecyclebased approach to cybersecurity risk management from beginning to end (US DoD,
2015a).
2.1.4 The Three Meta-Phases of Projects
It is important to understand the environment in which the project was conceived,
as well as the organizations who sponsor the project and their goals (PMI, 2017a) to
understand any given project. Many factors that may affect the overall success of the
project occur before the project is conceived or approved. Other factors will affect which
projects will be selected. To analyze project cybersecurity risk management effectively,
the authors found it necessary to use a “wide lens” to capture these factors that occur
before a project begins. This study proposes that there are three overarching stages, called
meta-phases that describe a project’s extended lifespan:
1. Project Conception: Includes all key activities leading up to the identification and
selection of the project for future development.
2. Project Execution: Includes the typical project lifecycle covered by project
management bodies of knowledge (PMI, 2013; PMI 2017).
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3. Deliverable Use: Covers project outcomes and use of a project’s product upon
delivery to the host organization(s).
These three project meta-phases are used in this research effort to temporally
describe influencing factors, potential threat conditions, and impacts related to
cybersecurity. Figure 2 shows the meta-phases in order of time.

Figure 2. Project meta-phases created to describe the extended project lifespan.

2.1.5 Project Stakeholders
A key concept in the project management literature is the concept of project
stakeholders (PMI, 2017). A project stakeholder is simply any person, organization, or
group which has an interest in the execution and outcomes of the project. Logically, these
stakeholders are present in each of the three project meta-phases, and therefore should be
considered in terms of the impact that cybersecurity events might have on their interests.
Cybersecurity may affect project stakeholders in two ways. First, project-related
activities that occur during the project meta-phases can affect the well-being of project
stakeholders. Second, actions by stakeholders, or inaction with regards to cybersecurity
precautions can expose the project to additional cybersecurity risks. In both cases, it has
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been demonstrated in the literature that actions or inactions by one group of stakeholders
can affect the security and wellbeing of other stakeholders. This concept is central to the
understanding of the dynamic nature and complexity of managing cybersecurity risks in
projects.
Stakeholders can be further subdivided into the following groups. Internal
stakeholders consist of the project team members, including the project manager and
cybersecurity professionals who are directly responsible for supporting the project.
External stakeholders include everyone outside the project team that can be affected by
the execution or outcome of the project activities. This can include customers, suppliers,
or other organizations. Each of the stakeholders can be both an asset and a source of
threats.
2.1.6 Project Assets
Project assets are defined as those assets which are significant to the achievement
of the project's goals and objectives. In each of the three project meta-phases, assets were
identified based on actors, activities, and artifacts that are commonly encountered. These
assets were grouped into project meta-phases based on when they are first created, used,
or modified to promote the project’s goals. For example, a project feasibility study is an
asset created in the project conception meta-phase, a legacy database is an asset that
might be used or modified in the project execution meta-phase, and an embedded cyber
component is an asset that is used by stakeholders in the deliverable use meta-phase.
Initially, a set of 25 project cyber assets were identified by the authors. Each asset is
identified with the one meta-phase where that asset is commonly encountered, created, or
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modified by project activities. These are shown in the three following tables for each
meta-phase.

Table 1. Common project assets found in the conception meta-phase.
Asset
Project idea
Proposal
Justification
Feasibility study
Business strategy
information
Management
personnel
Product or system
requirements

Description
The initial idea for a project. It may be in the form of verbal
communications or emails
Formal writeups which include more detail
Expected benefits to the organization, and overall target goals
for the potential new project. May include organizational
objectives, such as expected return on investment.
Information that the organization creates to determine if the
project idea is practical or desirable. Could include market
surveys or engineering studies.
Information related to overall management strategies,
especially information that is not publicly available.
People who provide operational, organizational, or executive
leadership and direction to the project team.
The information which describes in detail the desired outcome
or deliverable of the project activities

Table 2. Common project assets found in the execution meta-phase.
Asset
Project plans
Legacy database

Legacy code

Description
Can include project management plans, communication plans,
stakeholder lists, quality management processes, risk management
plans, or any other project-related planning information.
Database information about business processes or customers
which pre-dates the project which may serve as an input to or
reference for project team activities. Legacy databases exist before
the start of the project and are used in support of producing project
results or deliverables.
Software, including off-the-shelf and custom-developed, which
pre-dates the project and may serve as an input to project team
activities. Legacy code exists before the start of the project and is
used in support of producing project results or deliverables.
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Table 2 cont.
Asset
Project
management
artifacts
Technical project
infrastructure

Work-in-process
hardware and
software
Project team
members
Project
stakeholders
Third-party
vendors and
consultants
Project sponsors

Project data
exchange and
storage processes
Project team
mobile assets

Description
Team communications with sensitive project status information,
updated project status reports, schedules showing resource
assignments and percent completion of detailed tasks, and earned
value measurements (e.g., project plans, schedules,
communications, or budgets).
Includes computer hardware and software used as servers,
workstations, and networks that are acquired, used, or modified in
support of a typical project. Could include hardware and software
that is already in place before the project starts, purchased
specifically for the project, or a combination thereof.
Hardware or software that is to be created or modified during the
execution of the project; usually part of the project deliverable or
expected outcome.
People who are assigned to the project to perform work that
supports the creation of the project deliverables or outcomes.
People who are inside or outside of the sponsoring organization(s)
with an interest in the project outcome or deliverables, even if they
are not part of the official project team (e.g., customers, or people
from other divisions).
Companies and individuals who serve as team members that
provide support in producing the project outcomes or deliverables.
Involvement in the project means that they will likely have access
to potentially sensitive information about the sponsoring
organization, work-in-progress systems, and project deliverables.
These are individuals who are ultimately responsible for setting
the overall goals for the project so that organizational value
objectives are achieved (PMI,2017). Project sponsorship means
that they have access to information or other assets that will be
used in support of producing project outcomes or deliverables.
These processes may include the hardware, software, and methods
used to ensure the safe and secure transfer of vital information and
protected data between project team members.
Mobile devices (e.g., phones, laptops, tablets, and removable
storage) used by the project team. Could conceivably include
devices already in possession of the team members before the
project starts, devices purchased specifically for the project, or a
combination thereof. Could also be a combination of devices
formally assigned by the sponsoring organization, a third-party
contractor, or personal "bring-your-own" devices.
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Table 3. Common project assets found in the deliverable use meta-phase.
Asset
Deployment
process

Deployment team

Embedded cyber
components

Working system
Operational
employees (PostDelivery Support)
Deliverable
Update Processes
for Post-Delivery
Support

Description
Processes that are used to perform the delivery of project
deliverables or outcomes to the project stakeholders. Examples
include DevOps procedures used to make a new system ready for
end-users, or the hand-off processes used to transfer the design of
a newly designed product to a manufacturing organization.
People who perform the final delivery of project deliverables or
outcomes to the project stakeholders. Involvement means that they
have access to information about the project outcomes or
deliverables that is not publicly available. Examples include
people who perform a DevOps deployment of a new system to
production servers, or the team who sets up a new production line
for a new product design produced by the project team. They may
or may not be part of the official project team.
Includes any hardware, circuit board components, or software that
is part of the project deliverable or outcome. Conceivably, these
components might already exist in the marketplace before the
project start, or they could be entirely produced as part of the
project execution phase depending on the project and choices
made by the project team.
The functioning product with cyber components or information
system as it is deployed to end-users.
People responsible for maintaining, supporting, or updating the
project deliverable. Their involvement with the project outcome or
deliverable means that they have access to capabilities and
information that is not available to the general public.
Processes for maintaining, supporting, or updating the project
deliverable. Examples include packaging code for deployment and
DevOps procedures for releasing new updates and patches.

2.2 Cybersecurity Risk Management
Cybersecurity threats have long been recognized as a significant concern for
private businesses and government organizations. The threat landscape has been
described in detail in other reports and news sources and shows no signs of abating. An
earlier 2016 research effort by the author noted that reports of security breaches and
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criminal misconduct could be seen almost daily in major news sources, and this continues
to be true.
There are many examples of high-profile events highlighting the risks
cybersecurity threats can pose to any project and its stakeholder organizations (Rieder,
2014; Perez & Wallace, 2014; Rushe, 2015; Basu, 2015). This trend has been in place for
quite some time – in 2013 the number of cyber-attacks worldwide increased by 25%, and
in that same year, four of the ten largest data breaches in Internet history occurred
(Hendershot, 2014).
A significant part of the literature review examined academic literature on supply
chain cybersecurity, US Department of Defense documentation, and published breaches
to investigate whether cybersecurity risk management should take place earlier and
determined that an early ongoing effort should be considered due to the nature of the
threats (DoD, 2015a; DoD, 2015b). Conference papers published from this effort 2
(Presley & Landry, 2016; Presley et. al., 2018a; Presley et. al., 2020) concluded that
cybersecurity threats do appear to be a significant concern for IS projects and information
systems project managers by extension. These conference papers also found that
cybersecurity threats create risk on three fronts: risks to the day-to-day project activities,
risks to project deliverables, and risks to stakeholders as well.

2

Versions of some sections of this manuscript has been published at the Americas Conference on Information Systems (Presley,
Landry, and Shropshire, 2018a; Presley, Landry, and Shropshire, 2020) and the Southern Association for Information Systems
Conference (Presley and Landry, 2016, Presley and Landry, 2018b).
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2.2.1 Cybersecurity Summary
Given the scope of project management, it is important to select a definition of
cybersecurity that is useful in addressing risks in this context. The types of cybersecurity
threats are wide and varied – expertise and controls needed to combat them are similarly
diverse (US DoD, 2014; US DoD, 2015).
2.2.2 Cybersecurity Definitions
This study adopts a definition suggested by the dissertation chair as follows:
“Project cybersecurity is taking precautions to protect an extended
organization's valuable project and cyber assets against present and
future harm due to threats incurred during a project's extended lifespan
from inception through closeout.” (Landry, 2017)
The term cybersecurity in the definition is intentionally broad and inclusive, and
is based on synthesis from other similar definitions found in the literature. As an
example, the definition proposed by a member of the United States Department of
Defense is as follows:
“(Cybersecurity is) all organizational actions required to ensure
freedom from danger and risk to the security of information in all its
forms (electronic, physical) and the security of the systems where
information is stored, accessed, processed, and transmitted, including
precautions taken to guard against crime, attack, sabotage, espionage,
accidents, and failures.” (Cartwright, 2010, p.7)
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Cybersecurity risks are further defined as including all risks that can do the
following:
“…damage stakeholder trust and confidence, affect customer retention
and growth, violate customer and partner identity and privacy
protections, disrupt the ability to conduct or fulfill business
transactions, adversely affect health or cause loss of life, and adversely
affect the operations of national critical infrastructures.” (Cartwright,
2010, p.7)
Cybersecurity attacks, especially network breaches, are a highly publicized type
of cybersecurity risk. These are defined as:
“Hostile act(s) using computer or related networks or systems and
intended to disrupt and/or destroy an adversary’s critical cyber
systems, assets, or functions.” (Cartwright, 2010, p.5)
Highly publicized cybersecurity attacks, data theft, and unauthorized information
disclosures, such as the leaks by Eric Snowden (Reider, 2014), Target Stores (Perez &
Wallace, 2014), the Ashley Madison website (Basu, 2015), and US Government agencies
including the Office of Personnel Management (Rushe, 2015) have underscored the need
for proactive cybersecurity risk management.
Cybersecurity threats are important considerations throughout the project lifespan
for two reasons: First, there is the risk that a cyber-attack may disrupt the execution of the
project itself, leading to schedule delays and increased costs (Hendershot, 2014; US DoD,
2015a). Second, cybersecurity protections are increasingly required to be a part of the
deliverables of any project that includes an information systems component (Hendershot,
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2014; Corrin, 2015; US DoD, 2015b; Halvorsen & Kendall, 2015). Due to the ubiquitous
nature of information systems, it is reasonable to assume one or both conditions could
apply to a very wide range of projects.
Based on the review of the literature, including the Body of Knowledge model
from PMI (Hendershot, 2014; PMI, 2017a), documents and directives from the US
Department of Defense (US DoD, 2015a, US DoD, 2015b) and academic research, three
overarching themes emerge:
1. Cybersecurity risks are present in nearly every project and must be managed.
2. Cybersecurity presents a unique set of challenges, which must be considered
when creating a risk management strategy.
3. The problem is too complex for individual project teams to handle without
guidance and assistance from the PMO and IT security organizations.
2.2.3 Cybersecurity Risk Management Challenges
Cybersecurity threats change very rapidly. It is almost a foregone conclusion that
any definitive list of threats will be out of date almost as soon as it is written so that
ongoing monitoring will be needed (Hutchinson et al., 2011; US DoD, 2015b). This
challenge has led some to recommend an Agile approach, which is similarly based on
ongoing reviews and knowledge sharing (Hutchinson et al., 2011)
There are multiple sources of information about cybersecurity threats typically
used by organizations:
1. Scholarly Research, Conferences, and Security Conferences
2. News Articles from reputable sources
3. Project and IT Team Experience
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4. Government Websites
5. Vendor websites and security updates
6. Security and Consulting
Although it is important to consider the streams of information on specific threats,
it is the tacit knowledge of the team members that will enable the project team (including
the project manager) to take appropriate actions. This process has been described in the
organizational learning literature, which is described in more detail in a subsequent
section (Nonaka, 1994). Again, a huge challenge is the stream of information can be
overwhelming – it is difficult to apply the stream of knowledge to the specific
organizational and project-related requirements.
2.2.4 Quantitative Cybersecurity Threat Assessment
For reasons described in the earlier section, many projects will likely find
themselves as potential targets of a wide range of attacks or face other cybersecurity
threats. The project team must prioritize and select the appropriate action based on the
likelihood of the threat and the impact on the project and the project deliverables.
Many models for quantitative risk assessment exist, and prior research has
described approaches that yield useful information relatively quickly based on
information likely to be available to the project manager. An example of this type of
research can be found in a study of e-voting risks. This effort used a combination of
threat tree analysis and Monte Carlo simulations to perform quantitative analysis of
specific risks (Pardue et al., 2009).
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2.2.5 Cost/Schedule Cyber Risk Management Tradeoffs
A common theme in the risk management literature is the need to optimally select
strategies to manage risks that are commensurate with the expected likelihood of the risk
occurring and the potential costs or consequences of realized risks. Many models exist to
quantitively describe the risks and attempt to quantify a value. The value of the risk in
these models informs management on how much effort and resources should be expended
to manage these risks (Mayer et al., 2017).
In projects, especially ones that seek to achieve innovations, it is not clear
whether the project teams can accurately assess the likelihood or impacts of cybersecurity
risks, especially if team members do not possess the relevant experience. Finally, risk
management, in general, has been described as oft-neglected for the simple reason it is
often difficult for organizations to know how effective the efforts have been – risks that
never occur do not get management attention.
Security compliance often places requirements on project team members. Since
the time and effort of team members is a scarce commodity, this can involve a trade-off
for project team members: time spent managing cybersecurity risks can take time away
from completing the project deliverables. Recent research showed when rewards were
provided to encourage productivity (which would represent the real work towards project
goals), security compliance declined (Mayer et al., 2017). This illustrates the tradeoff
project teams face because compliance is an important aspect of cybersecurity risk
management. This tradeoff can be conceived as a tradeoff constraint of project
productivity and project cybersecurity risk management as seen in Figure 3. In this
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model, the project team will have a fairly static number of hours available to complete the
project, often determined by factors outside the project.

Figure 3. Common tradeoffs between cybersecurity mitigation and project productivity.

These factors are widely known as the project triple constraint (PMI, 2017a).
Once these boundaries are set in the project triple constraint triangle, there will be a fixed
amount of time available to the team, and a fixed number of resources (people) to
perform the work. This total effort is shown in the model as “Total Project Team PersonHours Available.” The net effect is a direct tradeoff between hours spent managing
cybersecurity risks (or any risks, for that matter) and the time spent creating the project
outcomes.
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2.3 Project Cybersecurity Risk Management
Based on the PMI recommendations regarding general risk management
principles (PMI, 2013) and the latest US Department of Defense (DoD) Instructions for
managing cybersecurity risk in acquisitions programs (US DoD, 2015a; Halvorsen and
Kendall, 2015), the perceived effectiveness of cybersecurity risk management efforts may
be related to a temporal factor (i.e., how early the cybersecurity risk management process
is initiated within the project lifespan). The author initially identified this characteristic
from a 2014 directive from the DoD, which has a long history, vast experience, and keen
ongoing interests in cybersecurity risk management (US DoD, 2014). This DoD
instruction mandates cybersecurity risk management be initiated at the beginning of the
project lifecycle and continued throughout (US DoD, 2014). This document suggests the
DoD places importance on an early start to cybersecurity risk management.

2.3.1 Project Cybersecurity Risks
Several factors make projects particularly susceptible to cybersecurity risk. First,
projects frequently are created to facilitate innovation, and the organization may be
dealing with new assets with which it is not familiar. These assets could include new
processes, products, and people who have not previously been part of the organization's
structure and activities. These processes, products, and people might not have been vetted
by the existing IT security teams because, for example, the security teams are not aware
of their existence. Second, projects are often used to create new products, systems, or
services that the organization may not have experience in handling. Whether or not the
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organization can secure these project deliverables is not a given. Organizations may be
very good at securing their existing assets, but this may not extend to innovations.
2.3.2 Cybersecurity Risks by Meta-Phase
Cybersecurity threats are examined here over a temporal horizon. Threats can
evolve from pre-project conditions, causing major disruptions to project activities and
project outcomes during project execution, and well after. Presenting threats, both
potential and realized, creates a “wide lens view” of project cybersecurity risk.
The project conception meta-phase begins with the organization identifying a
need or opportunity. After some due diligence by the organization, a project is proposed,
goals are identified, and the management of the organization formally approves the
project.
Effective cybersecurity requires that organizations already be prepared with
regards to their expertise, capabilities, and controls when this phase begins. Prior
literature has shown that lapses in cybersecurity during the project conception phase can
have long-term consequences, especially in the form of realized threats. Factors and
decisions which materially impact the cybersecurity risk profile of a project can exist for
many years or decades before they are discovered (Arthur, 2012; Skorobogatov & Woods
2012; Miller, 2017). Supply chain decisions and relationships have also been described as
significant sources of cybersecurity risk (Boyson 2014; Windelberg 2016), and these
relationships likewise can go back for many years.
It is reasonable to conclude based on prior research that, like other project
management factors, cybersecurity readiness is affected by an organization’s goals,
history, relationships to other organizations, and cultural factors (Marchewka, 2015).
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The project execution phase is where most risk management activities historically
take place (PMI, 2017a). It is in this meta-phase where impacts on realized cybersecurity
risks start to be felt. Realized threats were described in the literature and showed how
cybersecurity events can disrupt or even cancel ongoing projects. Just as significantly,
cybersecurity risks were shown to be introduced during the project execution phase and
had long-term impacts many years after the project concluded.
In the deliverable use meta-phase, the parent organization(s) take possession of
the project deliverables and put them into active use. Cybersecurity threats can create
vulnerabilities in the project deliverable. This can lead to profound consequences that
may not be discovered for months or years after the project concludes (Arthur, 2012;
Skorobogatov & Woods, 2012; Miller, 2017). In many cases, the causes can be traced
back to a lack of organizational understanding, limited funding, and a lack of project
team expertise needed to prevent cybersecurity threats. Going back further, it is likely
caused by decisions made well before the project began.
The net effect for any organization in this situation is simple: The project was
initially considered a great success because it accomplished its goals during the project
execution phase. But this initial success turned into a massive failure for the organization
because the project team was unable to identify or mitigate critical cybersecurity risks 3.
Figure 4 presents a timeline of project cybersecurity risk, which illustrates the
typical project activities that may either be affected by or become a source of

3

Versions of some sections of this manuscript has been published at the Americas Conference on Information Systems (Presley,
Landry, and Shropshire, 2018a; Presley, Landry, and Shropshire, 2020) and the Southern Association for Information Systems
Conference (Presley and Landry, 2016; Presley, Landry, and Shropshire, 2018b).
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cybersecurity risk in projects, as grouped by the project meta-phases. As support for the
timeline, Table 4 contains a summary of actual cybersecurity events analyzed through the
lens of the three project meta-phases.

Figure 4. Examples of common project activities in each project meta-phase.

2.3.3 Threat Vulnerability and Asset (TVA) Analysis
Fully cataloging all possible sources of risk to information systems is beyond the
scope of this research effort. The scope of this study instead uses a temporal project lens
that only focuses on risks that threaten a project’s actors, activities, and artifacts across a
project’s extended lifespan. Only those types of risks are being considered. The prior
section discussed the idea of project meta-phases, which are useful to summarize and
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parsimoniously describe project activities at the appropriate depth and breadth for this
research effort.

Table 4. Summary of selected security incidents.
Organization
E-Sports
Entertainment
Association
(ESEA)
(Book, 2017;
Daitch, 2017)

InterContinental
Hotels Group
(IHG)
(Osborne
2017;
Paganini,
2017;
Kastrenakes,
2017)

Security
Incident
December 30,
2016, ESEA,
one of the
largest video
gaming
communities,
revealed that
1,503,707
accounts had
been
compromised.

Analysis

This organization
implemented a
user account
subsystem &
database. The
new subsystem
was built,
implemented, and
benchmarked
before security
measures were
incorporated.
On February 7, Owns multiple
2017, a hotel
hotel chains with
conglomerate
credit card
announced a
processing
data breach that systems. Built
affected 1200 of and implemented
its properties.
a new centralized
The breach was billing platform
discovered after and prescribed
clients reported new network
fraudulent
security
charges on their configurations for
credit cards.
hotel chains. Did
not ensure that
the hotel chains
complied with the
security reqs.
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Vulnerability
Introduced
Project
Execution:
The late
addition of
security
measures

Impacts
Discovered
Deliverable
Use:
Large-scale
theft of
consumer
data.
Privacy
compromis
ed and
financial
loss

Project
Conception:
Lack of
mandate to
comply with
cybersecurity
standards
Project
Execution:
Inadequate
cybersecurity
risk
management

Deliverable
Use:
Large-scale
theft of
consumer
data.
Privacy
compromis
ed and
financial
loss

Table 4. cont.
Organization

Security
Incident

Analysis

Sony
(Esola 2014,
Harry 2015)

In two
separate
events in
2011 2014,
hackers stole
and destroyed
massive
amounts of
sensitive
corporate,
customer, and
projectrelated
information.

Target (Krebs,
2013; Finkle
& Heavey
2014; Krebs,
2014a; Krebs,
2014b; Krebs,
2015;
Manworren et
al. 2016;).

Hackers
installed
malware
using
phishing
attach against
a
subcontractor
project team
member and
obtained
credentials
used to steal
Target’s
customer
credit card
data

It is believed that
state-sponsored
actors were
responsible,
partially because
of the expected
release of a movie
offensive to the
North Korean
Government.
Movie productions
are commonly
referred to as
projects and meet
the common
definition (PMI,
2017a)
Data stolen
included the movie
scripts for
upcoming projects
Sensitive financial
data stored on
Target's servers
was improperly
protected and left
vulnerable to theft.
Using malware,
outside actors stole
project team
credentials and
compromised
Target’s network.
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Vulnerabilit
y
Introduced
Project
Conception:
Sony’s
cybersecurity
infrastructure
was
insufficient
to deter
attackers
Project
Execution:
Movie
project
nearing
completion.

Impacts
Discovered

Project
Conception:
Network
vulnerabilitie
s most likely
pre-dated
HVAC
projects

Deliverable
Use:
Catastrophic
loss of
customer
data and
public
relations
disaster

Project
Conception:
IP for
planned
projects
stolen and
movie
projects were
canceled.
Project
Execution:
Business ops
and projects
disrupted.
Deliverable
Use:
Customer
data and
privacy

An approach is also needed to parsimoniously describe and analyze cybersecurity
risks. Each project, organization, and deliverable will be vulnerable to certain specific
risks depending on the types of information systems assets on which they depend
(Whitman & Mattord, 2010). One approach has been to use a model which relies on
threats vulnerabilities and assets as the basis for risk assessment.
The TVA Analysis (Threats Vulnerabilities and Assets) model is described as a
means for an organization to understand their vulnerabilities (“know thyself”), to know
the vulnerabilities of adversaries (“know thy enemy”) and to take ownership and establish
accountability for risk management (Whitman & Mattord, 2010; Whitman & Mattord,
2016).
It is based on the idea that three communities work together to address every level
of risk to organizations’ information assets. Accountability is a key issue. The groups
include information security, information technology, and the organization's management
and user communities. Each group has an important role to play in protecting the
organization in an ongoing process. This process includes the identification of risks,
assessing risks, identifying controls, and conducting ongoing reviews. Figure 5 outlines
the process proposed by Whitman and Mattord (2010, p.279) with one minor
modification. In the original figure, the process steps followed a one-way linear path. A
search through cybersecurity literature found support for an iterative risk management
process and noted in the text of the TVA Model as well. Accordingly, the lighter line on
the right side of the model was added to reflect the iterative nature of the process.
Organizational security risk seems a reasonable starting point to understanding
program or project risks, which are sponsored by one or more organizations. A previous

37

2003 study by one of the TVA coauthors collected the following categories of threats by
literature review and interviews (Whitman, 2003).

Figure 5. Modified iterative risk identification process (Whitman & Mattord, 2010).

Whitman’s threat categories included acts of error, intellectual property
compromises, espionage, extortion, sabotage, theft, software attacks (worms, viruses),
natural disasters, quality of service (power and network providers), hardware/equipment
failures, software failures, and technical obsolescence (Whitman, 2003). All these
categories appear to be relevant given the types of activities and realized risks based on
the project cybersecurity literature review and literature.
The present dissertation effort identified the following TVA steps as being useful
in investigating the research question. The investigation includes asset identification and
classification, assessing relative values for information assets and listing them in order of
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importance, identification of threats and threat agents, and finally assessing the
vulnerability of each asset to the threats identified.
2.3.4 TVA Risk Identification Process
First, under the heading of risk identification, the TVA recommends creating an
inventory of Information Assets. Assets are identified and cataloged by managers in the
organization to cast as wide a net as possible. No attempt is made initially to judge the
relative value, as this will be done at a later stage (Whitman & Mattord, 2010 pp. 278283). Assets can generally include people, hardware, software, data, procedures, and
networking elements. These are referred to in the model as IT system components. Each
category has specific counterparts that are dependent on the organization.
Once assets are identified, their value to the organization is evaluated. A set of
critical factors are considered for each asset. These factors may vary but may include
criticality of the asset to the success of the organization, contributions to revenue and
profitability, cost to replace, cost to protect, and potential impacts (e.g., the disclosure of
sensitive information assets) on the firm’s public image (Whitman & Mattord, 2010).
Using the National Institute Standards and Technology document number 800-30, which
is part of a widely cited cybersecurity standard used by government and industry, the
valuation process was consulted and adapted in a manner consistent with other
applications of this standard (Whitman & Mattord, 2010; NIST, 2012). In the valuation
process, each factor is assigned a relative factor between 0.1 and 1.0. The intended result
is a weighted score for each asset which in turn can be used to produce a list of assets that
are ranked in relative importance to the organization.
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The next step is to identify possible threats and threat agents and prioritize these
as well. Table 5 shows each threat and an example (Whitman & Mattord, 2010, p.287).
The threat assessment process seeks to do two things: identify the threats which present a
danger to the organization’s assets currently, and prioritize those threats based on the
probability of attack and the impact of the event should it occur (Whitman & Mattord,
2010).
The next step is to assess the organization's assets for potential vulnerabilities. In
this step, the TVA process recommends reviewing each asset against the list of threats.
The result of each intersection is referred to as the threat-asset-vulnerability triplet which
forms the basis for further analysis.
For each threat asset triplet, the TVA recommends using a team of people with
diverse backgrounds to consider how the threat might affect the asset. It is subjective, but
through a series of brainstorming sessions, it is expected that participants with
backgrounds in information security, networking specialists, and business processes can
work together to create a list of possible vulnerabilities for each threat-asset triplet
(Whitman & Mattord, 2010, p.287).
As the final step in the risk identification process, a TVA Worksheet is created.
This worksheet includes the inputs of the prior efforts and assembles them into a matrix
as shown in
In Figure 6, adapted from the TVA literature (Whitman & Mattord, 2010, p.293),
assets are listed in priority along the top X-axis of the worksheet. Threats are listed along
Y-Axis. At the intersection of each X-Y axis is the cell which indicates a potential
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vulnerability. The intersection is referred to as the Threat-Vulnerabilities-Asset “triplet”
(Whitman & Mattord, 2010, p.293).

Table 5. Threats to information security (Whitman & Mattord, 2010).
Threat
Acts of Human Error or Failure

Example
Accidents, employee mistakes

Compromises to Intellectual Property

Piracy, copyright infringement

Deliberate acts of espionage or trespass

Unauthorized access and data collection

Deliberate acts of information extortion

Blackmail for information disclosure

Deliberate acts of sabotage or vandalism

Destruction of systems or information

Deliberate acts of theft

Illegal confiscation of equipment or
information

Deliberate software attacks
Forces of Nature

Viruses, worms, macros, denial-of-service
Fire flood earthquake and lightning

Quality-of-service deviations from service
providers
Technical hardware failures or errors

Power and WAN-quality of service issues
from service providers
Equipment Failure

Technical software failures or errors

Bugs, code problems, unknown loopholes

Technological obsolescence

Antiquated or outdated technologies

The colored bands in the worksheet indicate relative priorities, where priority one
indicates a vulnerability that has the highest levels of threats against the most valuable
assets. Preferably, the organization would address these vulnerabilities as the highest
priority before moving to the next set of vulnerabilities (priority 2). This process
continues until all vulnerabilities or addressed, or a decision is made that the remaining
vulnerabilities are not worth the expense of mitigation efforts.

41

2.3.5 TVA Risk Assessment Process
The term “risk” is defined in the TVA as “...the likelihood of the occurrence of a
vulnerability multiplied by the value of the information asset minus the percentage of risk
mitigated by current controls plus the uncertainty of current knowledge of the
vulnerability.” (Whitman & Mattord, 2010, p.295)

Figure 6. Example of a TVA worksheet used to prioritize threats to IT assets.

The first variable likelihood is expressed as the relative assessment of the
probability that a specific threat-asset vulnerability will be exploited, using a scale of 0.11.0 as recommended by the NIST 800-30 (NIST, 2012). This scale is not intended to
indicate a specific probability but rather a relative measure, although external or actuarial
data is preferred if it is available (Whitman & Mattord, 2010).
Another weighted score represents the assessment of potential loss, often from 1100 (Whitman & Mattord, 2010; NIST, 2012). The values are assigned based on prior
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threat assessments and discussions, such as which threats present the greatest risks to the
organization’s assets and how much it would cost to recover.
The risk assessment then factors in adjustments based on two factors. How much
prior work reduced exposure to the vulnerability is expressed as an estimated percentage
of the risk exposure that has been mitigated. Finally, an uncertainty factor is added based
on management’s experience and “good judgment” (Whitman & Mattord, 2010, p.297).
These factors are then used in the risk formula, and a relative score is calculated
for that vulnerability, which presumably should help the organization decide which
controls to purchase, and appropriate levels of expenditures.

Table 6. Consequence levels for organizational threats.

Level
1
2

Descriptor
Insignificant
Minor

3

Moderate

4

Major

5

Catastrophic

Example
No Injuries, no financial loss
First aid treatment, onsite release immediately
contained, medium financial loss
Medical treatment required, onsite release
contained with outside assistance, high financial loss
Extensive injuries, loss of production capabilities,
offsite release with no detrimental effects, major
financial loss
Death, toxic release offsite with detrimental effect,
huge financial loss

An alternate, simpler approach uses predefined scale values to indicate the
relative likelihood and consequences of a given vulnerability. Whitman and Mattord
adapted this approach from an Australian and New Zealand Risk Management Standard
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number 4360 (Australian and New Zealand Govt., 1999). This method attempts to use a
qualitative approach to assess the likelihood and consequence measurements. Table 6
shows one such scale for the consequences of a vulnerability being realized. Table 7
shows the scale for the likelihood of organizational threats. Table 8 shows the resulting
analysis and the results, which indicate the appropriate attention needed by management
(Australian and New Zealand Govt., 1999; Whitman & Mattord, 2010).

Table 7. Likelihood levels for organizational threats.

Level
A
B
C
D
E

Descriptor
Almost certain
Likely
Possible
Unlikely
Rare

Description
Is expected to occur in most circumstances
will probably occur in most circumstances
might occur at some time
could occur at some time
may occur only in exceptional circumstances

2.3.6 Documentation of the results of the Risk Assessment process
As an outcome, the TVA process envisions additional efforts being performed to
identify specific controls, monitor their implementation, and reassess periodically. As an
aid to the organization's leadership to facilitate decisions, reports are issued that reflect
the ranked vulnerabilities. A sample report appears in Table 9 (Whitman & Mattord,
2010, p.300).
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Table 8. Example of a TVA qualitative risk analysis matrix for assigning risk categories
to threat scenarios.
Likelihood
A (almost certain)
B (likely)
C (possible)
D (Unlikey)
E (Rare)

Consequences
Insignificant 1
H
M
L
L
L

Minor 2
H
H
M
L
L

Moderate 3
E
H
H
M
M

Major 4
E
E
E
H
H

Catastrophic 5
E
E
E
E
H

Key
E = Extreme Risk: Immediate action required
H = High Risk: Senior management attention required
M = Moderate Risk: Management responsibility must be specified
L = Low Risk: Management by routine procedures required

Table 9. Example of a TVA ranked vulnerability risk worksheet for prioritizing
cybersecurity risk mitigation.
Asset

Asset
Impact

Vulnerability

Vulnerability
Likelihood

Customer service
request via email
(inbound)
Customer service
request via email
(inbound)

55

Email disruption
due to hardware
failure
Email disruption
due to software
failure

0.2

Risk
Factor
Rating
11

0.2

11

Customer order via SSL
(inbound)

100

0.1

10

Customer order via SSL
(inbound)

100

0.1

10

Customer service
request via email
(inbound)

55

Lost orders due to
web server
hardware failure
Lost orders due to
web server ISP
failure
email disruption
due to SMTP
mail relay attack

0.1

5.5

55

45

For this research effort, the TVA methodology was selected to implement the
Qualitative Cybersecurity Risk Identification and Risk Assessment processes described
earlier in this chapter. The TVA Model offers an established methodology for performing
risk assessments. By combining this approach with the project meta-phases described
earlier in this chapter, the author was able to synthesize an approach for modeling project
cybersecurity risk.

2.4 ISRAM: Information Security Risk Analysis Method
To provide a proven process for the analysis of survey responses in a meaningful
and robust way, a lightweight semi-quantitative method was investigated called ISRAM:
Information Security Risk Analysis Method (Karabacak & Sogukpinar 2005). This
method is intended to cost and time-effective analysis of IS risk without relying on
extensive technical knowledge or expensive and sophisticated quantitative methods.
Particularly useful is ISRAM’s ability to combine qualitative estimates for likelihood and
consequence, resulting in a specific qualitative categorization of risk.
ISRAM combines a commonly used risk model with a straightforward
recommended method to aggregate and interpret survey results collected from many
participants. ISRAM is useful for this study is because it provides a reviewed and
published method for aggregating risk assessment responses into categorical scales (e.g.,
very low, low, medium, high, and very high). This provides a method and a context for
determining if participants believe there are meaningful risks associated with the
scenarios presented in the survey as described in section 4.2.6 Variable
Operationalizations and Measures.
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ISRAM fits the description in the literature of a semi-quantitative assessment
approach (NIST, 2012) because it involves collecting qualitative data using a defined
numerical scale based on the survey respondent's assessment of the question in relative
terms (e.g., on a scale of 1 to 5, how much value does an asset have in relative to other
assets). The original ISRAM refers to itself as a quantitative method; however, the
authors believe the NIST terminology is a better differentiator of this approach versus
exhaustive probabilistic analysis which would characterize more traditional quantitative
analytical methods.
ISRAM was based on the fundamental risk formula described in previous
literature (USGAO, 1999; Karabacak & Sogukpinar, 2005; NIST, 2012).
Risk = (probability of occurrence of a security breach)
x (consequences of the occurrence)
The risk model of ISRAM is deduced from this formula and is reproduced in
Figure 7.

Figure 7. ISRAM risk model (Karabacak & Sogukpinar, 2005).

ISRAM consists of seven steps, which were adapted to this study. Each of these
steps was used to analyze the data collected in the pilot survey. ISRAM step one is
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defined as the awareness of an information security problem. This is described in the
prior introduction section as the management of cybersecurity risk in the context of
projects. ISRAM steps two through five are used to prepare the survey, as well as define
the means of evaluating the results. Each step indicates actions corresponding to the two
terms in the project risk calculation – the probability of occurrence of a security threat,
and the consequences of that occurrence. These two terms are analyzed as two subprocesses in the ISRAM process (Karabacak & Sogukpinar, 2005).

2.5 Synthesis of a Project Cybersecurity Risk Management Framework
Cybersecurity risk management is an important concern for modern organizations
(Whitman, 2003; Whitman & Mattord 2010; NIST, 2012; US DoD, 2015a). To study the
research question When in the lifespan of the project does cybersecurity risk become
meaningful? it is necessary to synthesize a model which combines the temporal view of
project meta-phases with methods of cybersecurity risk management in general, and
cybersecurity risk identification and assessment.
This study adopts the concept of project cybersecurity, defined as "taking
precautions to protect an extended organization's valuable project and cyber assets
against present and future harm due to threats incurred during a project's extended
lifespan" (Landry, 2017). The concept and measurement of project cybersecurity risk
were synthesized by combining project risk management practices (US DOD, 2015a;
PMI, 2013) with theoretical and practical guidance on measuring and managing
cybersecurity risk in organizations (Whitman, 2003; Whitman & Mattord, 2010; NIST,
2012; US DOD, 2015a).

48

The approach adopted by this research effort combines project meta-phases with
the TVA Risk Management methodology (Whitman & Mattord, 2010). ISRAM supports
data collection and analysis associated with the cybersecurity risk model with a
straightforward method to aggregate and interpret survey results collected from many
participants (Karabacak & Sogukpinar, 2005).
Project meta-phases are believed to be an essential part of understanding
cybersecurity risk in projects. Using a project meta-phase to represent the time before the
actual start of the project is believed to be important because projects occur in the preexisting context of sponsoring organizations and external environments (PMI, 2013;
Marchewka, 2015). Cybersecurity risk to project activities and deliverables could
conceivably originate before the actual project start. The project conception meta-phase is
suggested to further study the effects of cybersecurity events that occur before a project
begins on project activities and deliverables. Similarly, projects can have lasting effects
on the sponsoring organizations; indeed, organizational changes are often a planned part
of projects (Marchewka, 2015; PMI, 2017). For this reason, the deliverable use metaphase was determined to be necessary to capture the impact of project decisions on the
future cybersecurity risk exposure of project stakeholders after a project completes. Many
examples of negative project-related cybersecurity realized risks occurring after project
completion were found in press articles and literature (Arthur, 2012).
To summarize the meta-phase model, three overarching phases are used to
describe a project's extended lifespan. The project conception meta-phase includes all key
activities leading up to the identification and selection of the project for future
development. The project execution meta-phase includes the typical project lifespan
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covered by project management bodies of knowledge (PMI, 2013). The deliverable use
meta-phase covers project outcomes and the use of deliverables by the host
organization(s) and stakeholders.
The project meta-phases are used in this research effort as a construct to enable
the analysis of the temporal nature of cybersecurity risk to projects and sponsoring
organizations. Project meta-phases are assigned as a descriptive variable to a series of
common project assets according to when these assets enter the project workstream and
are subject to attacks as described using potential threat categories. Assets that are
compromised will potentially impact the project processes and outcomes. This is the core
assumption behind using project assets and threats to those assets to assess potential
cybersecurity risks.
This approach is supported by prior work that recommended cybersecurity risk
analysis methods for organizations in general. For example, the Threat Vulnerabilities
Assets (TVA) model recommends using organizational assets as a means of measuring
cybersecurity risk (Whitman & Mattord, 2010), and this is also consistent with a widely
cited US Government-sponsored cybersecurity risk management standard (NIST, 2012).
Finally, threat categories (Whitman, 2003) were selected to describe at a sufficiently high
level the potential sources of cybersecurity vulnerabilities to project assets.

2.5.1 Identification of Potentially Vulnerable Project Assets
As the first step in this process, the author used the Project Asset inventory
approach to identify a preliminary set of project assets, which were later verified with a
panel of expert reviewers based on recommendations from advance reviews and the
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results of the pilot study. Based on the author’s observations and the literature review 4,
the assets needed by a project can change during the lifecycle of the project (Marchewka,
2015; PMI, 2017a). These changes could present a challenge for the TVA analysis if a
static organizational view is used. To address this challenge, the author synthesized an
approach in which a TVA asset inventory analysis was performed separately for each
project meta-phase. This approach allowed the author to capture the addition of new
assets as the project transitioned from one project meta-phase to the next. It also allowed
for the viewing of assets and potential threats from a much wider perspective than a
single point-in-time analysis. It is the ability to consider future impacts and identify
threats much earlier in the project lifespan that differentiates this approach from a
traditional point-in-time exercise of the TVA process.
When considering the possible sources of cybersecurity risks, it is necessary to
consider information systems assets created by the project (deliverables) and those relied
upon by the project team to perform project activities. In the case of technology assets of
any complexity, assets from both categories are potential sources of cybersecurity risk
exposure.
Asset categories are used in this study to describe those assets which are most
likely to be a target for an adversary. These may be vital tools for the project team or
contain information that is critical to the functioning of the project or deliverables.
During the literature review, there were many observed themes, as well as the author’s

4

Versions of some sections of this manuscript has been published at the Americas Conference on Information Systems (Presley,
Landry, and Shropshire, 2018a; Presley, Landry, and Shropshire, 2020) and the Southern Association for Information Systems
Conference (Presley and Landry, 2016; Presley, Landry, and Shropshire 2018b).
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extensive experience with information systems and manufacturing projects. Whitman and
Mattord’s text (2010) was used as a resource to identify assets. Rather than listing every
possible device asset, the team determined the asset category level of granularity
described in the Whitman and Mattord text was sufficient for this study. For example,
rather than listing every possible mobile device, an asset category of “project team
mobile assets” is used for such devices. These devices all have very similar features and
risks (e.g., man-portable devices that are constantly connected to the internet and are
easily subject to loss, theft, or damage). Due to the similarity of characteristics (e.g.,
portability, ease of theft) which seemed likely to affect their cybersecurity risk profile, it
was determined that little would be gained by giving each possible device a separate
entry in the asset inventory log.
Assets may be exposed to cybersecurity risks in each of the project meta-phases.
As the project progresses through each phase, a new set of assets are created and used
and are also exposed to varying sources of potential threats.
Table 10 summarizes the assets that are relevant to each meta-phase as well as the
values of the assets to the overall project goals and objectives. See Appendix C for the
complete set of project assets by meta-phase with descriptions.
2.5.2 Potential Project-Related Cybersecurity Threat Sources
In Figure 8, a view is proposed based on the literature review which explores the
concept of cybersecurity risk of individual organizations who participate in a project (as
represented by each sphere on the left), and the shared exposure related to the
relationships between each organization. It also includes, on the right-hand side of the
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graphic, a representation of possible adversarial groups that might pose a risk to the
project and the sponsoring organization.
This conceptual view would necessarily be different for each project and
organization but illustrates the complexity of the phenomenon at the application level.
Examples of each of these organizations that can be supported by the literature and
examples of recent high-profile breaches are presented in Table 11.

Table 10. Values of project assets commonly encountered during each meta-phase.
Project Meta-Phase: Conception
Assets: project idea, proposal, justification, feasibility study, business strategy,
management personnel
Asset Value: intellectual property value, research and development costs, the potential
return on investment, competitive advantage, proprietary knowledge, personal safety.
Project Meta-Phase: Execution
Assets: product requirements, project plans, legacy database, legacy code, project
management artifacts, technical project infrastructure, work-in-process hardware and
software, project team, project stakeholders, third-party vendors and consultants,
project sponsors, project data exchange and storage processes, project team mobile
assets.
Asset Value: sensitive information, business value, physical safety, replacement cost,
vectors for attack, R& D cost, R&D savings, reverse engineering opportunity,
proprietary secrets, access to product artifacts, human resource KSA, outside expertise,
process efficiencies, communication efficiencies.
Project Meta-Phase: Deliverable Use
Assets: deployment process, deployment team, embedded cyber components, working
system, operational employees, update process.
Asset Value: deployment success, realized product benefit, product safety, and
reliability, personnel safety, employee productivity, useful product life, organizational
value, information CIA + possession/authenticity/utility.

2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, the nature of projects and project risk management has been
described. Projects change over time, and the activities that affect the project begin much
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earlier than the project itself. Similarly, project impacts (including the fallout from
cybersecurity events) can occur long after the project concludes. As a result, there is a
need for researchers to parsimoniously describe the periods when these events occur, and
this was the motivation using project meta-phases to describe the project lifespan. Other
literature described the related phenomenon of project risk management and
cybersecurity risk management, which includes recommendations and tools for managing
cybersecurity risks for diverse activities. These tools and techniques are likely to be
useful for managing risk at the project meta-phase level.

Figure 8. The landscape of potential sources of cybersecurity threats for organizations
sponsoring programs and projects.
Cybersecurity threats directly affect project actors, activities, and deliverables in
industry, and therefore, cybersecurity risk is a real concern for project managers who are
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tasked with managing and reducing overall risk to project processes and project
deliverables.

Table 11. Project participants and components as potential risk sources.
Person or
Component
Program Sponsor
Primary Contractor
Subcontractor
Individual – Insiders
Individual – Outside
Attackers

Type

References

Organizational project
participant

PMI, 2013; Inter-Continental
Hotels Group (IHG) (Osborne,
2017)
Target (Finkle & Heavey, 2014;
Krebs, 2014a; Krebs, 2014b; Krebs,
2015; Manworren et al., 2016).
E-Sports Entertainment
Association (ESEA)
(Daitch, 2017; Book, 2017)
E-Sports Entertainment
Association (ESEA)
(Daitch, 2017; Book, 2017)
Target (Finkle & Heavey, 2014;
Krebs, 2014a; Krebs, 2014b; Krebs,
2015, Manworren et al., 2016).
Sony (Esola, 2014, Basu, 2015;
Harry, 2015)

Organizational project
participant / Possible
Threat Source
Organizational project
participant / Possible
Threat Source
Organizational project
participant / Possible
Threat Source
Threat Source

Activist
Organizations Hackers, Political
Groups, Terrorists
State-Sponsored
Cybersecurity
Programs

Threat Source

Threat Source

Sony (Esola, 2014, Harry, 2015)

The Exploitation of
Weakest Link

Security Principal

Shared Risk
Exposure / Supply
Chain Risk

Organizational Risk
Source

Service Level
Agreements

The primary control for
organizational risks

Target (Finkle & Heavey, 2014;
Krebs, 2014a; Krebs, 2014b; Krebs,
2015; Manworren et al., 2016).
Skorobogatov & Woods (2012)
Arthur (2012). Boyson (2014);
Perez & Wallace (2014);
Windelberg (2016)
Target (Finkle & Heavey, 2014;
Krebs, 2014a; Krebs, 2014b; Krebs,
2015, Manworren et al., 2016).
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The literature from both areas, cybersecurity risk management, and project
management suggests that the synthesis of a model related to the temporal nature of
projects combined with risk analysis techniques could be used to describe the changing
risks posed by cybersecurity threats over the lifespan of the project. As project activities
change over time, new assets are created and assigned to the project as it matures.
The TVA model shows how cybersecurity risks are tied to asset vulnerabilities.
As the assets used by the project team change and become more or less important as the
project progresses, it follows that cybersecurity risks also change and evolve (Whitman &
Mattord, 2010). Based on the synthesis of the TVA model and the temporal view
provided by project meta-phases, a viable approach to describing and managing project
cybersecurity risks may be to consider the risks in the context of each of the project metaphases.
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CHAPTER III
RESEARCH MODEL AND HYPOTHESES

3.1 Introduction to Research Model
This chapter develops conceptual and research models for studying the
phenomenon of project cybersecurity risk management. Prior literature has addressed
cybersecurity risk management from the perspective of an organizational entity, such as a
business or government agency. This research effort builds on the literature described in
Chapter II by extending the research in managing cybersecurity risk for projects, which
are essentially a type of temporary organization. Because projects have defined lifespans,
the conceptual and research models include a means of referring to the high-level phases
of a project. Project meta-phases are used for this purpose.
The limited lifespan of project teams is a key differentiator of projects versus
other organizations. To help determine whether further study into this phenomenon is
potentially fruitful, it is necessary to discover what role, if any, the temporal nature of
projects plays in the management of cybersecurity risk. This research effort, therefore,
seeks to determine whether cybersecurity risk is present in any of the project metaphases.
As described in Chapter I, the research question for this study is when in the
lifespan of the project does cybersecurity risk become meaningful? To address this
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question, this chapter proposes research constructs to represent cybersecurity risk
throughout the project lifespan. To help ensure the generalizability of results across
project types, these constructs are based on typical cybersecurity threats to common
project assets. Prior literature described how cybersecurity threat categories and assets
can be examined to identify potential vulnerabilities, which can be used to analyze
cybersecurity risk at the organizational level (Whitman & Mattord, 2010). The project
lifespan is described using project meta-phases that were created for this study as
described in the earlier section. The constructs are presented and explained in the context
of the literature review. The following sections also describe the testable hypotheses.

3.2 Conceptual Model
The conceptual model for this study centers around a temporal view of project
risk. Risks to project assets are posed to occur across an extended lifespan starting when
assets are first conceived, produced, or used in the furtherance of organizational goals.
The variables for the study are defined in Table 12. The high-level conceptual
model is presented in Figure 9. This model shows that the cybersecurity risk in a given
project is comprised of the cybersecurity risk present in each of the high-level project
meta-phases. This corresponds to each of the hypotheses in the study.
In Figure 10, the detailed conceptual model expands the view further to include
additional detail related to cybersecurity risk occurring across a project’s lifespan. Project
assets are potentially vulnerable to many types of cybersecurity threats, which can be
identified by considering how threats across various categories could potentially impact
the assets' confidentiality, availability, or integrity (Whitman, 2003, Whitman & Mattord,

58

2010). These intersections are conceptualized in the literature as Threat-VulnerabilityAsset triads (Whitman & Mattord, 2010). It is the combination of risk associated with all
triads where the associated assets are used or created in a project meta-phase that
constitutes the cybersecurity risk for that meta-phase.

Table 12. Conceptual model constructs used to study cybersecurity risk.
Construct
Project Conception
Cybersecurity Risk
Project Execution
Cybersecurity Risk
Project Deliverable Use
Cybersecurity Risk
Project Cybersecurity
Risk
Project Assets
Cybersecurity Threat
Categories
Vulnerabilities

Risk Scenario

Description
The likelihood and impact of loss or harm associated with
realized cybersecurity vulnerabilities of project-related
assets during the project conception (i.e., prior to the
official project start)
The likelihood and impact of loss or harm associated with
realized cybersecurity vulnerabilities of project-related
assets during the project execution time period
The likelihood and impact of loss or harm associated with
realized cybersecurity vulnerabilities of project-related
assets during project deliverable use (i.e., after the project
closes and deliverables are put into use)
The likelihood and impact of loss or harm associated with
realized cybersecurity vulnerabilities of project-related
assets during the extended project lifespan (all project
meta-phases)
Project actors, activities, and artifacts that are used or
created during a project’s extended lifespan and that have
value toward achieving project goals.
Common threats to a wide range of information systems
assets, organized into 12 categories (Whitman, 2003)
“Specific avenues that threat agents can exploit to attack
an information asset” (Whitman & Mattord, 2010, p.292).
Occurs at the intersection of a specific project asset and
threat category.
Represents the estimated risk (likelihood times impact)
presented by a specific vulnerability to a project asset that
corresponds with a commonly encountered cybersecurity
threat category (USGAO, 1999; Whitman, 2003,
Whitman & Mattord, 2010)
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Figure 9. Conceptual model of project cybersecurity risk as inclusive of the risk of each
project metaphase.

Figure 10. Detailed conceptual model showing risk scenarios as the unit of measure for
project meta-phase risk.

Finally, risk at the TVA Risk Item level is conceptualized in this study as a
function of two independent variables associated with each TVA triad: the likelihood of a
particular TVA event, and the overall impact of the event on the project stakeholders.
Impacts are measured according to multiple dimensions (Whitman & Mattord, 2010).
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3.3 Research Model and Construct Definitions
Each of the constructs in the conceptual model was further defined to establish the
research model for the study. The lowest unit of analysis are assets that are commonly
used or created during the extended project lifespan which are directly related to the
achievement of project goals. From this level, threat categories are adopted from the
literature and considered alongside assets to identify common vulnerabilities (Whitman,
2003; Whitman & Mattord 2010). This intersection of assets, threat categories, and
specific vulnerabilities are operationalized as scenarios.
Figure 11 presents a graphical view of the expanded research model.

Figure 11. Expanded research model for detecting the presence of cybersecurity risk.

Study participants will be asked to provide an assessment with regards to the
potential likelihood and impact of TVA Risk Scenarios, which will allow for a semiquantitative value to be assigned in accordance with the ISRAM methodology described
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in Chapter II. Using the ISRAM methodology, a measurement of risk can be produced
and analyzed in a quantitative manner for each of the project meta-phases. The quantified
risk measurements for each meta-phase are then used to test each of the three hypotheses
described in the following chapter.

Table 13. Research model constructs for hypothesis tests.
Project Conception MetaPhase Cybersecurity Risk

Risk (likelihood and impact) associated with
cybersecurity threats affecting vulnerable project assets
that are used or created during the project conception
meta-phase.
Project Execution MetaRisk (likelihood and impact) associated with
Phase Cybersecurity Risk
cybersecurity threats affecting vulnerable project assets
that are used or created during the project execution
meta-phase.
Project Deliverable Use
Risk (likelihood and impact) associated with
Meta-Phase Cybersecurity
cybersecurity threats affecting vulnerable project assets
Risk
that are used or created during the deliverable use metaphase.
Project Cybersecurity Risk
Risk (likelihood and impact) associated with
cybersecurity threats affecting vulnerable project assets
that are used or created during all project meta-phases.
Risk Scenario
Likelihood of an event occurring based on a TVA triad
scenario multiplied by the expected impact of the event
to produce a single risk score.
Risk Scenario Probability of Semi-quantitative measurement of the likelihood of a
Occurrence
TVA event using ISRAM methodology
Risk Scenario Consequence Semi-quantitative measurement of the impact of a TVA
of Occurrence
event using ISRAM methodology
Project Asset
List of common project assets as vetted by an expert
panel
TVA Triad (Scenario)
Formed by considering the potential for threat
categories to impact project assets’ confidentiality,
integrity, or availability (CIA) in a specific manner.

Table 13 describes each of the Research Model Constructs. There is a slight
difference in terminology between the TVA method and the ISRAM method. In the TVA
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methodology, the two components of risk are the likelihood that an event will occur and
the impact of the event. In the ISRAM method, the two components are referred to as
probability of occurrence and the consequences of the occurrence. For this study, these
terms are interchangeable. Therefore, this study adopts the ISRAM terminology as it is
the methodology used going forward.

3.4 Hypotheses
The research model is designed to facilitate the study of the original research
question when in the lifespan of the project does cybersecurity risk become meaningful?
This study, therefore, seeks to answer the research question by examining the
cybersecurity risk present in each of the project meta-phases.
Therefore, to answer the research question, three hypotheses were formed to test
for the presence of cybersecurity risk in each of the project meta-phases.

3.4.1 Cybersecurity in the Project Conception Meta-phase
H1. There are risks to project cybersecurity during the project conception meta-phase
There were several examples noted in the literature of assets being compromised
before the actual start of the project. This period is referred to as the project conception
meta-phase. A set of project assets was devised believed to be directly related to the
project conception meta-phase. This set was based on practitioner models (PMI, 2013) as
well as contemporary reports of cybersecurity events.
One such example is Sony Pictures. Sony suffered a network break-in which
compromised several projects before the selection and start of the actual projects in the
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entertainment industry. Reports indicated that the unauthorized release of movie scripts
prompted Sony to cancel these projects (Esola, 2014; Donnelly, 2014; Harry, 2015).
3.4.2 Cybersecurity in the Project Execution Meta-phase
H2. There are risks to project cybersecurity during the project execution meta-phase
During the project execution meta-phase, several examples of assets being
compromised during the execution of the project were identified, as well as examples of
cybersecurity attacks, which impacted the project activities. A set of project assets that
were required and affected during the project execution meta-phase was identified. It was
noted that during project execution, many new assets are added or created during this
phase according to the project management literature (PMI, 2013).
Contemporary reports were found describing how cybersecurity events can have a
significant negative impact on project execution. In the previous Sony example, the
impacts of the break-in disrupted several ongoing projects. The Sony event is also a clear
example of how a cybersecurity incident that occurs at the organization level can impact
project teams as well, regardless of their operational distance from the regular
organizational operations (Esola, 2014; Harry, 2015).
3.4.3 Cybersecurity in the Deliverable Use Meta-phase
H3. There are risks to project cybersecurity during the project deliverable use metaphase
Cybersecurity risks are often manifested after the project is completed and the
project deliverables go into use. There are many examples of projects where
cybersecurity vulnerabilities were not discovered until well into the project deliverable
meta-phase. The Target breach is a widely studied example: a sub-contractor was using
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Target’s billing system to manage invoices for completed project work, and due to the
contractors own internal cybersecurity vulnerabilities, their Target system credentials
were stolen and used to steal the credit card information of millions of customers (Finkle
& Heavey, 2014; Krebs, 2014a; Krebs, 2014b; Vijayan, 2014; Krebs, 2015; Manworren
et al., 2016;). Another example is the vulnerability discovered in the Actel/Microsemi
ProASIC3, a military-grade FPGA. Many prior project teams had used this chip in the
design of military systems and a prominent commercial aircraft (Arthur, 2012;
Skorobogatov & Woods, 2012). When such threats are discovered, the costs of the
vulnerability can include recall of the products, negative publicity, and should the
vulnerability cause the failure of a critical system, even human lives.
Finally, there is at least one example where a major product release was canceled
right at the end of the development project. Mozilla canceled one of its product releases
because the perceived cost of managing cybersecurity risk after launch was too high to
justify the release of the product (Nightingale, 2014).

3.5 Conclusion
As a summary, the concept of project cybersecurity risk was conceptualized in the
context of project meta-phases. Three hypotheses were devised to test the existence of
project cybersecurity risk in each of the project meta-phases. The model and hypotheses
developed in this chapter will be empirically tested by research methods presented in the
next chapter.

65

CHAPTER IV
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter describes the research methods which will be used to investigate the
research question described in Chapter I, when in the lifespan of the project does
cybersecurity risk become meaningful?
The overall research strategy is a cross-sectional field study performed using an
online-facilitated variation of a group-administered questionnaire method (Trochim,
2006; Salkind, 2006; Bhattacherjee, 2012), which relies on web-based tools for survey
administration and participant selection.

4.1 Justification of Research Strategy
The cross-sectional field study design was selected for this study. In order to
address the research question and test the resulting hypotheses, prior work suggested that
approximations of cybersecurity risk could be made using expert opinions of likelihood
and potential impacts. This study is based instead on the opinions and judgment of
professionals who would likely have experience with similar assets in the project context
and also have knowledge of common cybersecurity threats to common project assets.
Other research methods were considered, such as case studies and focus groups,
but these methods would not provide a sufficiently broad perspective to capture the wide
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range of possible scenarios this study is seeking to consider. The cross-sectional survey
method allows for a sufficiently large number of responses so that generalizability to a
larger population is enhanced.

4.2 Research Design
This section discusses the detailed research design. It includes the units of
analysis, the creation of the project asset threat scenarios, sampling strategy, and variable
operationalization in the context of the survey instrument.

4.2.1 Units of Analysis
There are two levels of analysis under consideration for this study. The highest
level is the project meta-phase, which contains a collection of uniquely identified assets
that are relevant based on common activities that logically occur within the confines of
that meta-phase.
The data collection unit is the threat-project asset pair. The threat-project asset
pair represents the potential risk to the sponsoring organization if it were to be affected
by a common type of cybersecurity threat during specific time periods called project
meta-phases. For the purposes of this study, risk is defined as the probability that the
project asset will be impacted by a particular cybersecurity threat and the consequences
of this happening to the project stakeholders.
For data collection, all data is from a single source – a widely dispersed group of
individuals with professional experience with information systems projects. Criteria for
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inclusion in the study are professionals with at least two years of experience as project
managers, at least two years of experience as a cybersecurity professional, or both.
4.2.2 Survey Instrument Creation Strategy
The following section describes the overall approach used to create the survey
instrument. The actual process occurred over several years and went through multiple
iterations. The process can be simplified for brevity and clarity into four steps:
identification of a cybersecurity threat model, identification of project assets, pairing
assets with common cybersecurity threats to create scenarios that describe possible events
that would harm a project or its stakeholders. Based on these scenarios, the survey
instrument asks respondents to assess the relative likelihood or probability of occurrence
of each scenario, and also the potential consequences of a similar scenario occurring.
The results are then analyzed using the ISRAM methodology to attempt to detect the
presence of cybersecurity risk in each of the project meta-phases.
4.2.3 Asset Identification
Project assets were identified from the literature review and then narrowed down
to a shorter list using a combination of two pilot studies and expert panel review. This
section describes the overall reasoning and the selection process used.
According to Whitman and Mattord (2010), the first step in the information
security risk identification process is to compile a list of information assets. The list was
created using an organization system view common to the field of information systems
and included information assets that are important to the organization’s processes and
outcomes. Asset categories include computer-based technology artifacts, such as
hardware, software, data and information, and telecommunications and networking
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devices, as well as the organizationally important non-technical assets, particularly
people and procedures. Table 14 was derived from Whitman & Mattord (2010) and other
sources of project-related risk information (PMI, 2016). It is a summary of the types of
assets likely to be present in a typical information systems-related project. In order the
further illustrate the relevance of the assets to a typical project, the researcher added
examples which appear in Appendix C.

Table 14. Common project IT assets.
IT System
Project-Related Risk Management Components
Components
People

People both inside and outside of the organization who provide services
or who have access to other assets used by the project team, or have
access to sensitive IT assets

Procedures

Business procedures which are directly related to the project activities,
project decision-making processes, policies, and the expected
organizational value that the project is expected to realize

Data

Data and Information that is accessed, produced, or used by the project
team members during the project lifespan

Software

Software that is produced, used, or modified by the project team to
produce the deliverables of the project or achieve the expected project
organizational value

Hardware

Devices that are being used, modified, or invented by the project team
members to produce the deliverables or achieve the expected project
organizational value

Networking

Networking components that are used by project team members to
perform project activities

To produce a list of project cyber assets to be used in this study, the project metaphase framework and Whitman’s information systems component categories were used.
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Each project meta-phase was described and documented in terms of its essential actors
(people), artifacts (data and information, hardware, software, and networks/devices), and
activities (processes). These actors, artifacts, and activities were used to produce metaphase-specific project cyber-assets. A list of 26 assets resulted from the initial effort.
This study used a wide lens for identifying project assets to form a more
temporally inclusive picture of project cybersecurity risk. For example, project ideas,
intellectual property, and early market research are valuable assets of great interest to a
competitor and come into existence before the project is formally announced and staffed
(i.e., the project conception meta-phase). Other assets become involved much later in the
project lifespan. For example, prototypes are not likely to appear until the project is well
into the execution meta-phase. Delivered products may become important as potential
sources of risk to the sponsoring organization after the project team disbands.
Once the asset list was created, the researcher then wrote value statements based
on prior project experiences and common scenarios observed in news articles, project
management, and cybersecurity texts (Whitman & Mattord, 2010; Marchewka, 2015).
These value statements were intended to provide common examples to support the idea
that they are valuable to project stakeholders in terms of the expected project outcomes
and therefore merit further study. The list of 26 project assets, organized by project metaphase and with associated value-statements for each asset, appears in Appendix C
4.2.4 Cybersecurity Threat Scenario Creation
A list of common cybersecurity threat categories was used for the sake of
parsimony. From the literature review, Whitman’s list of 12 threat categories was adopted
for this purpose.
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4.2.4.1 Initial Threat-Asset Pairing.
Each of the selected project assets was paired with a threat category in a manner
prescribed by the TVA and NIST methodologies (Whitman & Mattord, 2010; NIST,
2012). This represents the “Threat Asset” pair that formed the basis for the future survey
questions. The study intended to ask the expert respondents whether a given project asset
was likely to be impacted by a cybersecurity threat from the identified category. Because
each asset is potentially used or created during the three project meta-phases, it is
believed this methodology can be used to detect whether cybersecurity risk is present in
each of these project meta-phases.
4.2.4.2 Early Pilot Test.
An early pilot test was conducted on an initial data collection approach. That early
approach asked experts to assess risk on threat-asset pairs alone. The approach was an
abstract pairing of asset names and threat categories. The approach was evaluated by a
small number of experts that included members of the dissertation committee.
Based on pilot test results, it was decided to add a hypothetical scenario to better
illustrate how a project asset might be vulnerable to a particular threat category by giving
the respondent a more concrete example of how such a threat might play out. Scenarios
(USGAO, 1999) were written based on examples found in news sources which illustrated
examples of the identified project asset being compromised in some manner by a
cybersecurity threat from one of Whitman’s (2003) cybersecurity threat categories.
From a theoretical standpoint, the hypothetical scenarios represented
vulnerabilities considered representative of the threat-asset pairings. Creating this set of
vulnerabilities was intended to mimic the process of vulnerability identification inherent
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in the TVA process. With the intent of writing one scenario for each of 25 assets, an
initial set of 18 scenarios were managed to be written, pairing a unique asset with a
threat. The threats repeated but the assets did not. Theoretically, the 18 scenarios
represented 18 threat-vulnerability-asset triplets.
4.2.4.3 Pilot Study.
A second pilot survey was then designed around the use of hypothetical scenarios.
Subjects were to read a scenario and respond as to the riskiness of a similar scenario
occurring in their own environment. There were items on asset value, for assessing
consequence, and likelihood, used in combination to assess risk according to TVA
methodology.
For analysis of pilot data, the ISRAM methodology, described in Chapter II, was
used to help categorize computed risk values for hypothesis testing. The TVA method
allowed for the calculation of a relative risk value useful for ranking risks, but without a
sense of anchoring on a scale, such as low, medium, and high. Hypotheses in this study
require a more precise scale. The ISRAM methodology provided a way to take mean
likelihood and consequence scores, scale them, multiply them together, and use the
resulting risk value to map to a risk category. The ISRAM risk categories are Very Low,
Low, Medium, High, and Very High.
The goals of this pilot test were twofold. First, a goal was to determine if the
survey had face validity. Would the respondents be able to understand the risk posed by
the project cybersecurity scenario and estimate it? Second, the pilot would enable the
researcher’s practice of using the ISRAM method for calculating risk and determining if
the subjects would find significant risk in the project scenarios.
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The pilot survey was administered in the Fall 2019 semester at the student’s
university. It was given to 25 students enrolled in a graduate-level class in information
assurance. Each student was asked to answer a subset of six of the 18 pilot scenarios
developed. Either 8 or 9 students responded to each scenario. Likelihood and
consequence values were aggregated, producing scores for each scenario. The mean
likelihood score for a scenario was multiplied times the mean consequence score for that
scenario, producing 18 calculated risk scores, one for each scenario. Using ISRAM, each
scenario was assigned a risk category consistent with the calculated risk score.
The results of the pilot study supported the study’s goals. Of the 25 students
surveyed all but one found it easy to estimate risk and complete the survey. Moreover,
the respondents believed risk was present in all 18 scenarios to some degree. That is, the
risk categories ranged from Medium to Very High, with no Low or Very Low scores.
There were two Very Highs, nine Highs, and two Mediums.
Following the pilot study, and after review by the committee, additional
modifications to the survey were made. An additional seven scenarios were written to
provide coverage of all 25 assets, each with one scenario. To eliminate social desirability
bias, the wording on risk items was changed. Rather than asking subjects about risk in
their own organization, they were instead asked to focus on risk present in the scenarios
themselves. The items for likelihood and consequence were modified to be consistent
with the ISRAM method as follows. The TVA asset valuation approach for estimating
consequent was replaced with a single question directly asking for consequences using a
scale of 1 to 5, and the likelihood item was converted from a 1-7 scale to a 1-5 scale.
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4.2.4.4 Expert Panel.
As a further test of the usefulness and validity of the survey instrument, an expert
panel was conducted. One of the panel’s goals was to test content validity. Content
validity is “an assessment of how well a set of scale items matches with the relevant
content domain of the construct that it is trying to measure” (Bhattacherjee, 2012, p. 59).
It is common to use expert judges in the domain of inquiry to assess content validity.
Lawshe (1975) established a quantitative test of content validity through the use of
experts who voted on each of a construct item’s usefulness/necessity for measuring the
construct in question. The Lawshe content validity question used was as follows, with
“N” being the number (1-18) of the scenario whose content was being validated:
Question N.4: Is the threat scenario…
o

Essential

o

Useful but not essential

o

Not necessary

Another goal of the panel was to test internal validity. Each scenario was mapped
by the researchers into a specific project meta-phase. However, would experts agree with
these mappings? So, each scenario included a question, as follows:
Question N.3 When are [assets in the scenario] first created, used, or
modified in a typical project?
1 - Project Conception (i.e., before the project officially begins)
2 - Project Execution (i.e., when the project is ongoing)
3 - Deliverable Use (i.e., after the project is over and deliverables are
being used)
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4- Not Applicable (i.e., this is not an asset for most projects)
Ten experts were solicited for the panel. A survey was implemented in Qualtrics
and sent to the experts via an email solicitation. One week later a reminder was sent. Of
the ten experts originally contacted, five completed the survey, and a sixth completed half
of the survey but also supplied a lengthy email with qualitative feedback. All expert input
was used in the analysis.
Four main issues arose from the expert review. Three of these were content or
internal validity issues and the remaining one dealt with response rate and respondent
fatigue. In summary, the issues were: (1) some scenarios were deemed by experts as “not
useful”; (2) mapping scenarios to the correct project meta-phase was difficult, as experts
disagreed; (3) some scenarios lacked enough detail for estimating risk; and (4) the survey
was found to be too long. Each issue was addressed.
One of the three content validity issues surfaced by experts was that of item
usefulness. Not all of the 25 scenarios were found to be equally useful. In fact, some
experts responded to the Lawshe question with the “not useful” decision. We decided to
remove all ten of these from the survey. This action served two purposes. It eliminated
scenarios that experts deemed not useful, leaving only more useful ones. It also helped to
shorten the survey.
These scenarios were re-read in an attempt to interpret why they received a “not
useful” vote. In most cases, it was likely because there was very little risk perceived by
the expert. Either it was because the scenario was unlikely to occur or else would not
result in significant consequences. In other cases, the scenario may have been too similar
to another scenario.
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The experts were asked to map threat scenarios to project meta-phase, but they
rarely agreed. Only one of the scenarios was mapped by all experts as intended. The
lowest level of agreement on any meta-phase was 33%, and the average agreement across
all scenarios was 70%.
The issues with non-agreement were believed to be ambiguous. Some of the
scenarios were complex with issues of causation present at a different time than when the
threat was being realized. Scenarios were revised to remove ambiguity. The manipulation
check questions were kept in the survey to be used as an internal validity check on the
subsequent data collection.
The expert who provided the qualitative feedback explained that several scenarios
lacked risk-related detail. Specifically, he asked “what kind of system was breached?” or
“what kinds of data are stored in that system?” or “what was the consequence of that
vulnerability?” The lack of detail prevented him from specifying a risk-related
consequence in particular. These scenarios were improved by adding details such as
“customer information system” or “financial data.”
The risk-related scores were calculated and assessed. The highest probability and
consequences of project cybersecurity threats were in the project execution meta-phase
(3.29 and 3.88 on a 5-point scale), followed by the deliverable use meta-phase, and then
conception. Each meta-phase had at least one threat scenario rated at a level of 3.5 or
better for probability and consequences. That is a level between medium and high
probability and between important and serious consequences.
Finally, the issue of survey length was addressed. One of the experts said that the
survey took him one hour. The co-authors themselves agreed that it could take
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respondents about 45-minutes once the extra instructions and questions for experts were
removed. Some guidance states that most respondents would prefer to take about 10-15
minutes maximum (Bhattacherjee, 2012, p. 77). In the interest of response rate and
preventing fatigue, the survey was shortened. The instructions were shortened to a bare
minimum, including only the briefest of explanation and only that information required
by our university’s Institutional Review Board to inform and protect human subjects.
It was decided to use exactly four scenarios per meta-phase. In addition to the
scenarios eliminated from experts rating them as “not useful,” several others were
eliminated. Not only did this decision help with a respondent satisfaction issue, but it
created a more balanced set of scenarios. With the equal splitting of scenarios across
metaphases, a possible confounding variable was eliminated. Since the larger study is
hypothesizing at the level of risk at the project meta-phase, it is important to eliminate
alternative explanations for why risk varies.
Each of the scenarios was then reviewed and revised to try to minimize researcher
bias and remove leading language which might influence the respondent. Finally, a 13th
scenario was added as a control, which was intended to represent a scenario with a low
probability of occurrence and few or no consequences if it did occur.
Finally, each of the scenarios was worded in such a way as to clearly indicate a
particular project meta-phase. It also clearly identifies the project asset and threat
category. Following is an example of the wording of the scenario:
“Scenario 1: Consider whether project proposals might be vulnerable to
deliberate acts of espionage or trespass before a project officially begins. The
following scenario is an example of how this might occur:
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A movie studio had its email server breached, and subsequently lost project
proposals in the form of movie scripts. The proposals were stolen and made
available to the public, leading to the cancellation of scheduled movie production
projects after other film companies started making competing movies.”
Table 15 provides a list of each scenario, the threat category, and the intended
project meta-phase. A complete list of scenarios along with the wording is presented in
Appendix B.
4.2.5 Sampling Strategy
For data collection, all data is from a single source – a widely dispersed group of
individuals with professional experience with information systems projects. The
overarching goal was to include professionals with experience in cybersecurity, project
management, or both. This is driven by the need to select participants who possess
adequate professional experience and educational background to understand and offer
opinions on the phenomenon.
4.2.5.1 Survey Power Analysis.
Statistical power analysis was performed to determine a satisfactory sample size.
A prior study suggested a general rule is to have at least five subjects for each variable to
achieve a satisfactory level of power. This acceptable level is suggested to be .80
(Grover, 1997). As this study tests hypotheses at the level of the threat-vulnerability-asset
scenario, and there are 12 scenarios in which to test, the rule-of-thumb would be to
collect data from 12 x 5 or 60 respondents. Further analysis of statistical power was
conducted using the G*Power statistical tool (Faul et al., 2007) which also supports the
widely accepted statistical power modeling of Cohen (1977). See Figure 12.

78

Table 15. Project assets, threats, and meta-phases used in each scenario.
Scenario Project Asset
Number
1
Proposals
2
3

Business Strategy
Information
Project Plans

4

Justification

5

Technical project
infrastructure
Legacy code

6
7
8

Work in progress hardware
and software
Legacy database

9
(control)
10

Technical project
infrastructure
Operational employees

11

Deployment Process

12

Working System

13

Working System

Threat Category
Deliberate Acts of
Espionage or Trespass
Deliberate Acts of
Espionage or Trespass
Technical hardware
failures or errors
Technical hardware
failures or errors
Acts of human error or
failure
Technological
obsolescence
Acts of human error or
failure
Deliberate Acts of
Espionage or Trespass
Acts of human error or
failure
Deliberate Acts of
Espionage or Trespass
Acts of human error or
failure
Acts of human error or
failure
Technological
obsolescence

Project MetaPhase
Conception
Conception
Conception
Conception
Execution
Execution
Execution
Execution
Execution
Deliverable Use
Deliverable Use
Deliverable Use
Deliverable Use

Using Cohen’s model and G*Power, several assumptions were made. One is that
the significance level would be the most widely accepted level of 0.05. The desired
power for the test would also be the most commonly accepted level, 0.80, which means
that there will be an 80% chance of accepting the alternative hypothesis when it is true or
an 80% chance of finding significant results when they are present in the population. The
research hypotheses would be tested using a one-sample t-test, which is an appropriate
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statistical method for comparing a mean value against a constant, used in this study to
represent the threshold level of significant risk. A medium effect size is also assumed,
which Cohen (1977) defines as 0.5 for this analysis. As the figure indicates, a sample of
27 respondents would be needed for the assumptions given. The rule of thumb provided
an estimate of 60, while the power analysis procedure provided an estimate of 27. The
actual sample size of 66 was achieved, which exceeds both estimates.

Figure 12. G Power analysis output used to target sample size for survey distribution.
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4.2.5.2 Survey Participant Selection.
Participants were recruited by Qualtrics Research Services and were compensated
by Qualtrics using their internal payment system (Qualtrics, 2021a). The amount and
form of compensation were negotiated by Qualtrics with each individual, which could
include gift cards, cash payments, or other remuneration. The specific terms were not
disclosed to the research team.
Initial screening and qualification of participants were performed by Qualtrics to
yield a sample of 66 respondents, with the following targeted experience. Qualtrics stated
they performed an informal review of each potential respondent’s self-reported
experiences using the LinkedIn.com application. It was thought to be important to have
representation from professionals with both project management and cybersecurity
experience, so Qualtrics agreed to the following quotas for selection:


At least 33 respondents with two years or more professional project management
experience



At least 33 respondents with two years or more professional experience in
cybersecurity-related roles.

The online questionnaire was then delivered to a group of professionals meeting the
sample selection criteria using the Qualtrics survey application (Qualtrics, 2021a).
The use of Qualtrics is thought to be a more reliable source of qualified
candidates than using similar online recruiting and delivery methods, such as Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk, which rely entirely on self-reporting and the discernment of the
researchers. The use of online tools to recruit participants with significant industry
experience has been useful in other studies (Shropshire et al., 2018). Research

81

community guidelines were consulted for similar online recruiting and delivery methods
(Mason & Suri, 2011; Lease et al., 2013; Princeton Survey Research Center, 2016; UC
Berkeley, 2018; Shropshire et al., 2018).
4.2.5.3 Data Quality Precautions.
A major concern in online survey research is that data quality can be negatively
affected by cheaters, bots, and duplication. Qualtrics provides as part of their service the
means to reduce the likelihood of these threats to data quality (Qualtrics, 2021b).
This study opted to include an expert review by Qualtrics such that potentially
fraudulent responses were not included in the data reported. As part of the survey tool,
Qualtrics provides fraud detection, prevention of multiple submissions, bot detection,
security scan monitoring, RelevantID scores, and adding fraudulent detection fields to the
survey flow.
Qualtrics employs two enabling technologies which were leveraged to further
reduce the risk of fraud. Imperium is a provider of technologies that use data science to
reduce fraud, and Qualtrics uses scores provided by their RelevantID technology to detect
duplicates and bots (Imperium, 2021). Qualtrics also uses Google's invisible
reCAPTCHA technology for bot detection.
In the survey, each scenario included an attention check question immediately
after the scenario description that asks for the project meta-phase the scenario is
describing. The answer to this question is underlined in the scenario text making it very
unlikely that an attentive respondent would overlook the answer.
Qualtrics would only allow for three attention check questions to be used for
terminating the session and rejecting the survey response. Questions 1, 5, and 10 were
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selected as the early termination questions: Failure by a respondent to answer any of
these correctly resulted in them being taken to the end of the survey, and their responses
were not recorded.
4.2.6 Variable Operationalizations and Measures
The following section described the operationalization of the variables used to
approximate the constructs used in the study. There are three main constructs needed to
test the hypotheses in this study. These constructs are the level of cybersecurity risk
present in each of the three project meta-phases and are referred to as project conception
risk, project execution risk, and project deliverable risk (that is, the risk associated with
the ongoing use of the outputs of a project).
Based on the literature review and research model, the overarching project metaphase risk constructs are multidimensional: contained within each are two unidimensional
constructs related to the probability of occurrence and the consequences of the occurrence
of the TVA risk scenarios associated with each respective metaphase. Specifically, one
sub-construct refers to the likelihood that a negative cybersecurity event will impact a
project during a particular meta-phase, and the other sub-construct refers to the impact or
consequences that such an event would have on the project team, the project itself, or the
sponsoring organizations. The variables used to measure these constructs are shown in
Table 16.
4.2.6.1 Variable Measurement Using ISRAM.
To measure the variables in the constructs, a lightweight semi-quantitative
method was chosen called ISRAM: Information Security Risk Analysis Method
(Karabacak & Sogukpinar, 2005). This method is intended to be a cost and time-effective
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analysis of IS risk without relying on extensive technical knowledge or expensive and
sophisticated quantitative methods. ISRAM consists of seven steps, which were used to
analyze the data collected in the pilot surveys, the expert panel, and the final survey.
Minor scale adjustments were made to reflect the changes in the survey questions. Each
of the seven steps prescribed by ISRAM was followed and this process is described
below.

Table 16. Operationalizations of scenario risk variables.
Variable

Operationalization

Threat scenario likelihood

A score on a 1-5 scale from Very Low to Very High of
a respondent’s assessment of the likelihood of that
scenario’s occurrence during the specific project metaphase.
A score on a 1-5 scale from Negligible to Very Serious
of a respondent’s assessment of the negative
consequences that would result from that threat
scenario’s occurrence.
A score on a 1-25 scale, computed as the product of a
respondent’s estimates of likelihood and consequence
for that threat scenario.
The average on a 1-25 scale of all respondents’
computed risk scores for that threat scenario, converted
to a 1-5 categorical scale from Very Low to Very High.

Threat scenario consequence

Threat scenario risk score
Threat scenario risk category

ISRAM was based on the fundamental risk formula described in previous
literature (USGAO, 1999; Karabacak & Sogukpinar, 2005; NIST, 2012).
Risk = (probability of occurrence of a security breach) x (consequences of the
occurrence)
ISRAM step one is defined as the awareness of an information security problem.
This is described in the prior introduction section as the management of cybersecurity
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risk in the context of projects. The preceding sections in this chapter describe how the
TVA process was used to create threat-asset pairs based on common project assets,
cybersecurity threat categories, and scenarios that describe potential vulnerabilities.
ISRAM steps two through five are used to prepare the survey, as well as define
the means of evaluating the results. Each step indicates actions corresponding to the two
terms in the project risk calculation – the probability of occurrence of a security threat,
and the consequences of that occurrence. These two terms are analyzed as two subprocesses in the ISRAM process (Karabacak & Sogukpinar, 2005).
4.2.6.2 Operationalization of Probability of Occurrence.
ISRAM Steps 2,3, and 4 were followed to create a risk table for response
aggregation and analysis. For this study, the probability of occurrence relates to the
probability that a particular scenario will occur during a particular project meta-phase.
Each scenario in the survey describes a vulnerability of a common project asset to a
common cybersecurity threat category taken from academic, private, and public sources
(Whitman, 2003). In other words, the TVA scenarios are used to illustrate a hypothetical
situation whereby a threat from one of these categories is used to harm a project asset. To
measure the probability of occurrence, we ask the respondent to tell us the likelihood this
scenario will occur and then analyze the results using the ISRAM risk tables.
This list of threat categories combined with project assets is used to satisfy step
two of the ISRAM model. The survey asks respondents to assess the probability that each
asset could be compromised or otherwise vulnerable to the specific threat category as
described in each scenario using a 5-point Likert scale response.
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Table 17 shows how the probability of occurrence responses in the survey
instrument were interpreted using the ISRAM methodology:

Table 17. Risk table for risk scenario probability of occurrence responses (T1).
Lowest Possible Value
Highest Possible Value
Range of Values
Intervals (Range/5)
Interval Excess
Survey Results Lower Bound
0
2
3
4
5

0
5
6
1
0
Survey
Results Upper Bound
1
2
3
4
5

Qualitative Scale
Very low probability
Low Probability
Medium Probability
High Probability
Very High Probability

SemiQuantitative
Scale
1
2
3
4
5

Table 18. Risk table for risk scenario consequences of occurrence responses (T2).
Lowest Possible Value
Highest Possible Value
Range of Values
Intervals (Range/5)
Interval Excess
Survey Results - Lower
Bound
0
2
3
4
5

0
5
6
1
0
Survey
Results Upper
Bound
1
2
3
4
5

Qualitative Scale
Negligible Consequences
Minor Consequences
Important Consequences
Serious Consequences
Very Serious Consequences

86

SemiQuantitative
Scale
1
2
3
4
5

4.2.6.3 Operationalization of Consequences of Occurrence.
The consequences of occurrence survey questions are interpreted using ISRAM.
Table 18 shows how survey responses were interpreted to form categories using the
ISRAM methodology (Karabacak & Sogukpinar, 2005).
4.2.6.4 TVA Scenario Risk Table Creation.
Step 7 of the ISRAM process includes the assessment of results to obtain a single
risk value for a potential security risk problem. In the terms of our study, the 13 TVA
scenarios are equivalent to the potential problems described in the ISRAM method. For
each of the 13 threat scenarios, there will be a risk score associated. ISRAM allows us to
aggregate many responses into a single score for each scenario. The semi-quantitative
aspect of ISRAM suggests that we can take the qualitative responses from the survey,
assign values and aggregate them, and then use Table 19 to calculate a qualitative
description of the combined opinions of respondents of the probability and consequence
of each scenario. The following table is adapted directly from ISRAM and is used to
assign an overall risk level for each scenario.

Table 19. Final risk table and overall qualitative risk levels.
Probability (T1)
Consequences (T2)

Risk = (T1) x (T2)

1: Very Low

2: Low

3: Medium

4: High

5: Very High

1: Negiligible

1: Very Low

2: Very Low

3: Very Low

4: Low

5: Low

2: Minor

2: Very Low

4: Low

6: Low

8: Medium

10: Medium

3: Important

3: Very Low

6: Low

9: Medium

12: Medium

15: High

4: Serious

4: Low

8: Medium

12: Medium

16: High

20: Very High

5: Very Serious

5: Low

10: Medium

15: High

20: Very High 25: Very High
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The final step of the analysis process involves grouping scenarios into metaphases to determine if one or more of the scenarios associated with a particular metaphase is medium or higher. Table 19 will be used to test the three hypotheses in the study.

4.3 Data Collection
This section includes the steps used in the data collection process. Prior pilot
studies and expert panels were performed, and the survey design and methodology were
finalized based on the findings and adjustments made to the survey instrument. A final
soft launch was performed using the final instrument where 10 responses were collected
and analyzed.

4.3.1 Soft-Launch Pilot Study and Validation
After publishing the final version of the survey as shown in Appendix B,
Qualtrics was instructed to collect responses from 10 subjects as a final validation of the
survey instrument and data collection process. These responses were collected on
November 18, 2021.
Once the survey responses were collected, an initial analysis was performed using
descriptive statistics to examine the responses received, the averages of responses for
each of the survey questions, and the time required for each respondent to complete the
survey. Analysis of the soft-launch pilot data ran from November 19 to November 21,
2021.
While no material changes were made to the survey instrument, minor
adjustments were made to the acceptance criteria for attention check failures and the

88

quota for respondents’ experience levels (i.e., the balance of people with PM experience
versus cybersecurity experience). It was also clarified that the quota would include at
least 33 people with project management experience and at least 33 people with
cybersecurity experience. Current job titles were not to be used for meeting the quotas.
This was because the respondents often had both project management and cybersecurity
experience; originally it was thought that they would have one or the other, but this was
not observed during the soft-launch pilot.
It was also noted that four of the respondents in the Pilot study failed more than
four attention checks overall. These respondents also spent a minimal amount of time on
the survey, leading the researcher and advisors to believe these four rushed through the
survey without comprehension. It was decided to require future respondents to pass all of
the 3 attention check questions, as this would have prevented the four from being
included in the sample but would not have impacted other respondents who spent more
time and got most of the attention checks correct. For consistency, these four
respondents were subsequently excluded from the sample used for the rest of this study.
4.3.2 Data Gathering
Once the soft-launch pilot analysis was completed, Qualtrics resumed the
collection of the data for the full sample. A notification was given to potential
respondents via email, and the Qualtrics project manager and the team ensured that the
received responses met the guidelines for the relevant experience levels. They also
checked whether the three identified attention check questions (1, 5, and 10) were
answered correctly. Any responses that did not meet the experience or attention check
requirements were removed before sending to the researcher.
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The researcher was then notified that all 66 responses had been received and that
the four suspect responses had been removed. The researcher downloaded the data from
the Qualtrics site. All responses and demographic data were included in the downloaded
Excel worksheet. The data in the Excel file was then copied and transposed into a new
worksheet using standard Excel functions for further analysis and descriptive statistics.
Manual checks showed that the data transposed properly, and the responses were also
double-checked for encoding correctness by comparing the data reported against a full
printout of the survey into MS work from the Qualtrics web-based survey tool.’

4.4 Conclusion
This concludes Chapter IV, which described the research methodology that was
used in the survey instrument creation, data collection, pilot studies, and the data analysis
plan. Chapters V and Chapter VI will discuss the data analysis results, conclusions,
strengths, and weaknesses of the study.
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CHAPTER V
DATA ANALYSIS

This chapter discusses the data analysis methods used for investigating the
research question posed in Chapter I and tests the three hypotheses presented in Chapter
III. This chapter includes a description of the sample, descriptive statistics, and two
separate statistical tests of each of three hypotheses.
Two main methods were used to analyze the data to determine if the hypotheses
were supported. First, the lightweight semi-quantitative ISRAM methodology was
followed to determine if any of the threat scenarios in each project meta-phase was at
least medium or higher. Second, statistical analysis was performed on the ISRAM scores
for each threat scenario to examine whether one of more scenarios in each meta-phase
still registered at the medium level once the observed variance was taken into account.
For this study, a medium level of risk is operationalized as meaningful for the purpose of
testing the hypotheses.
One of the threat scenarios in the survey was intended to operate as a control.
That is, the control scenario was intended to represent a low probability of occurrence
and low consequences. Participant responses to this question were compared statistically
to the responses to the other threat scenarios to see if at least one of the threat scenarios in
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each metaphase was believed to represent at least a medium or higher level of potential
risk.

5.1 Description of Sample
Including the soft-launch pilot and the full follow-on data collection, a total of 70
responses were received. As described in section 4.3.1 Soft-Launch Pilot Study and
Validation, 4 of the initial responses were rejected due to failed attention checks and very
low time spent on completing the survey. This brought the total number of usable
responses to 66.

5.1.1 Descriptive Statistics of the Sample
Descriptive statistics based on the collected sample are shown in Table 20:

Table 20. Descriptive statistics of sampled respondents.
Descriptive Statistic

Observed

Total Responses (N)
Gender: Female
Gender: Male
Gender: Other / Prefer not to respond
Age - mean (excluding no responses)
PM years of experience – mean (excluding those with no
experience)
PM years of experience – mean (all)
Cybersecurity years of experience– mean (excluding those with
none)
Cybersecurity years of experience – average (all)
Average % of attention check questions passed
Average time to complete (minutes)
Shortest time to complete (minutes)
Longest time to complete (minutes)

66
26
39
1
43
10
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9.8
5.9
4.0
91.7
10.2
3.5
29.9

The demographic data confirmed that the respondents were consistent with the
goals of the study. It was hoped that respondents would have at least two years of project
management or two years of experience as a cybersecurity specialist. In the responses,
the average number of years of experience for people with that skill set was 10 years.
People with cybersecurity experience had an average of 5.9 years. An unexpected but
welcome statistic was many respondents met both qualifications: 38 respondents had two
or more years of experience in both project management and cybersecurity, and 44
respondents had at one year in addition to meeting the two-year requirement in the other
discipline. Having experience in both disciplines is thought to provide an ideal
perspective since the scenarios touch on both cybersecurity and project concerns.
Statistics were collected regarding the education levels of the respondents. As
shown in Table 21, the education levels were skewed towards college graduates, with
80% completing a degree, and 77% with a bachelor's or higher.

Table 21. Education levels of survey respondents.
Degree

Frequency

Pct

Cumulative Percent

Some School, No Diploma

0

0

0

High School Graduate or
equivalent
Some college, no degree
Associate degree
Bachelor's
Master's
Professional
Doctoral
Total

7

10.6

10.6

6
2
28
17
4
2
66

9.1
3.0
42.4
25.8
6.1
3.0
100.0

19.7
22.7
65.2
90.9
97.0
100.0
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During the data collection process, the time required by each respondent to
complete the survey was captured by the Qualtrics survey software. The average time to
complete the survey was estimated to be 19 minutes by the survey software, and tests
seem to indicate about 10-15 minutes in practice runs. The observed durations were
shorter than expected, but it is believed that the attention check questions enabled the
detection and elimination of responses that were rushed.
Sample statistics were calculated to determine how long it took respondents to
complete the survey and are shown in Table 22.

Table 22. Mean time spent by respondents to complete the survey.

N

Valid
Missing

Mean
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum

Duration
(in seconds)
66
0
610.71
345.421
208
1796

Duration
(in minutes)

10.18
5.76
3.47
29.93

Statistics were also calculated to determine the number of correct responses for
the attention check questions for each respondent. These were tallied to determine
whether respondents read the scenario closely enough to answer the simple questions
where the answer was explicitly given and underlined in the scenario text. If a respondent
was unable to answer the attention check question for a scenario, their responses were not
considered further for that scenario. It is believed that respondents who missed these
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questions did not read or understand the scenario, and therefore their responses to the risk
questions would be unlikely to reflect a considered opinion.
Table 23 represents both the number of correct attention check questions passed
for each scenario, as well as the number of value responses for each scenario.

Table 23. Correct attention check question responses by scenario.
Scenario
Scenario 1
Scenario 2
Scenario 3
Scenario 4
Scenario 5
Scenario 6
Scenario 7
Scenario 8
Scenario 9
Scenario 10
Scenario 11
Scenario 12
Scenario 13

Meta-Phase
Conception
Conception
Conception
Conception
Conception
Conception
Conception
Conception
Conception
Conception
Conception
Conception
Conception

Number Correct
65
58
60
57
66
56
58
62
61
64
56
54
61

5.2 Data Preparation
Upon receiving data from Qualtrics and converting it into an SPSS input data file,
the following procedures were performed to ready the data for analysis. The scripts for
the following activities in SPSS are captured in Appendix F. First, the items asking for
the metaphase, labeled as Q1.1, Q2.1, …. Q13.1, were recoded into variables using a
more meaningful naming convention: Metaphase1, Metaphase2, … Metaphase 13. Next,
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the scales for scenario probability and consequence were converted from a 1-6 scale to a
0-5 scale, where the 0 was for Not Applicable. Then, all of the non-applicable responses
for any probability or consequence scores were converted to missing data, so that they
would be excluded from the analysis. These transformations did not overwrite the
existing responses but were transformed into new variables with meaningful names, as
was done with the metaphase variables. The names were Probability1 to Probability13
[scenario number] and LikelihoodConsequence1 to Consequence13 [scenario number],
where scenario numbers ranged from 1 to 13. Scenario 9 was the low-risk control
scenario.
Next, the new probability and consequence variables were transformed to missing
values if the subject had not correctly coded the meta-phase in the attention check metaphase question. Thus, probability and consequence scores for threat scenarios were only
kept if that subject had correctly identified the meta-phase associated with that scenario.
New variables were created to store calculated risk scores. The variables were
named RiskCon1 - RiskCon4, RiskExec5 - RiskExec8, RiskLowCtrl9, and RiskDUse10 RiskDUse13. These variable names included the word “risk,” the abbreviated metaphase
name, and the scenario number. Note that RiskLowCtrl is the variable name for scenario
9. The risk scores were calculated as Probability x Consequence for that scenario. The
range for risk scores was thus 1 to 25.
If a respondent incorrectly answered an attention check question, the risk score
was not calculated for the scenario where the attention check was missed. The exception
to this was for the control scenario (Scenario 9). The reason for the exception is two-fold.
First, the control scenario was worded in such a way that it could happen in any of the
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three scenarios. Second, the control scenario risk value is important to enable the twosample paired t-test later on. Eliminating the control risk value would have caused us to
remove that entire respondent from the statistical analysis, which was seen as
undesirable.

5.3 Descriptive Statistics of Responses by Metaphase
Table 24 shows the overall average scores for probability and consequences for
each threat scenario along with the aggregated score for risk. It was noted that all of the
mean scores were above the threshold for medium risk (8) with several above the
threshold for the high-risk category. This along with the implications is discussed further
in section 5.4 ISRAM Methodology Risk Levels. Each of the statistics is examined in
more detail.

Table 24. Descriptive statistics of scenario risk scores.
Threat
Scenario
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9 (control)
10
11
12
13

Metaphase
Conception
Conception
Conception
Conception
Execution
Execution
Execution
Execution
Any Phase
Deliverable Use
Deliverable Use
Deliverable Use
Deliverable Use

Likelihood
(mean)
3.5077
3.4237
3.6167
3.4386
3.5455
3.5893
3.3966
3.3226
3.2623
3.6250
3.7321
3.4364
3.7705
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Consequences
(mean)
3.8182
3.8621
4.1639
3.5088
3.9848
4.0714
3.8966
3.8226
2.7742
3.9697
3.8246
4.1667
4.0323

Risk Score
(mean)
13.8154
13.5862
15.4333
12.4035
14.3485
15.0536
13.5000
13.0968
9.6557
14.7500
14.5357
14.6481
15.6557

5.3.1 Descriptive Statistics – Probability
For each of the scenarios, Table 25 shows descriptive statistics for Risk Scenario
Probability of Occurrence variable measurements.

Table 25. Descriptive statistics of the risk scenario probability of occurrence variables.
Scenario
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9 (Control)
10

Meta-Phase
Conception
Conception
Conception
Conception
Execution
Execution
Execution
Execution
Any Phase
Deliverable Use

N
65
59
60
57
66
56
58
62
61
64

Min.
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

Max.
5.00
5.00
5.00
5.00
5.00
5.00
5.00
5.00
5.00
5.00

Mean
3.5077
3.4237
3.6167
3.4386
3.5455
3.5893
3.3966
3.3226
3.2623
3.6250

Std. Deviation
1.01740
1.00350
1.10610
1.03540
1.13926
1.07495
1.10723
1.15623
1.30258
1.06160

11

Deliverable Use

56

2.00

5.00

3.7321

0.98148

12

Deliverable Use

55

1.00

5.00

3.4364

1.16688

13

Deliverable Use

61

1.00

5.00

3.7705

0.98984

5.3.2 Descriptive Statistics – Consequences
For each of the scenarios, the mean, maximum value, minimum value, and
standard deviations were calculated for the risk scenario consequences of occurrence
variable measurements as shown in Table 26.
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5.4 ISRAM Methodology Risk Levels
Using the ISRAM methodology each scenario was tested using the mean of the
threat scenario risk scores. The risk scores were calculated individually, and then the
mean of all respondents was taken.

Table 26. Descriptive statistics of the risk scenario consequences of occurrence variables.
Scenario
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Meta-Phase
Conception
Conception
Conception
Conception
Execution
Execution
Execution
Execution
Any Phase
Deliverable Use

N
66
58
61
57
66
56
58
62
62
66

Min.
1.00
2.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
2.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

Max.
5.00
5.00
5.00
5.00
5.00
5.00
5.00
5.00
5.00
5.00

Mean
3.8182
3.8621
4.1639
3.5088
3.9848
4.0714
3.8966
3.8226
2.7742
3.9697

Std. Dev
1.10814
0.98138
1.05167
1.21189
1.01515
0.96967
0.98568
1.15268
1.40747
1.00720

11

Deliverable Use

57

1.00

5.00

3.8246

1.01985

12

Deliverable Use

54

1.00

5.00

4.1667

1.02331

13

Deliverable Use

62

1.00

5.00

4.0323

0.92271

Table 27 shows the descriptive statistics for these risk scores, which are
calculated for each respondent for each scenario. Table 28 shows the results of the
ISRAM analysis, in which the qualitative description is determined from the risk score
based on the ISRAM Threat Scenario Risk Table as described in section 4.2.6.3 and is
sorted by levels of risk.
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Table 27. Descriptive statistics of the ISRAM risk scores for each scenario.
Scenario
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

Meta-Phase
Conception
Conception
Conception
Conception
Execution
Execution
Execution
Execution
Any Phase
Deliverable Use
Deliverable Use
Deliverable Use
Deliverable Use

N
65
58
60
57
66
56
58
62
61
64
56
54
61

Mean
13.8154
13.5862
15.4333
12.4035
14.3485
15.0536
13.5000
13.0968
9.6557
14.7500
14.5357
14.6481
15.6557

Std. Dev
6.25223
5.45487
6.62140
6.46380
6.43187
6.48192
6.28909
6.65228
7.04009
6.55865
6.33594
6.25604
6.26335

Std. Err. Mean
0.77549
0.71626
0.85482
0.85615
0.79171
0.86618
0.82580
0.84484
0.90139
0.81983
0.84668
0.85134
0.80194

Table 28. Mean ISRAM risk score for each threat scenario from highest to lowest.
Scenario

Meta-Phase

N

Mean

13
3
6
10
12
11
5
1
2
7
8
4
9 (Control)

Deliverable Use
Conception
Execution
Deliverable Use
Deliverable Use
Deliverable Use
Execution
Conception
Conception
Execution
Execution
Conception
Any Phase

61
60
56
64
54
56
66
65
58
58
62
57
61

15.66
15.43
15.05
14.75
14.65
14.54
14.35
13.82
13.59
13.50
13.10
12.40
9.66
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ISRAM Overall
Risk Level
High
High
High
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium

5.5 Statistical Testing
The following section discusses the statistical tests used in the analysis of the data
received. ISRAM is considered a lightweight methodology that, while useful for its
methodology of aggregating and categorizing both likelihood and consequence estimates
from multiple respondents into risk scores, does not feature robust statistical processes.
To perform meaningful testing of the hypotheses it was decided to use two forms of ttests to determine if the mean of the risk score obtained from each scenario was different
(higher) than the risk score of low-risk scenarios. The one-sample t-test was used to
compare the scenario means against a constant risk score of “8” which corresponds to the
lowest risk score for medium risk using the ISRAM methodology. The reasoning is that
any scenario with a mean risk score higher than this score could safely be said to have at
least a medium level of risk according to the survey responses. For this study, meaningful
risk is operationalized as a mean risk score corresponding to the medium ISRAM
category or higher for the purpose of testing the hypotheses.
A two-sample paired t-test was then used to compare each person's scenario risk
scores against their scores for a control scenario intended to represent low risk. Scenarios
with a mean risk score higher than the control scenario mean risk score at a statistically
significant level further support the idea that respondents considered those scenarios to
have a meaningful (ISRAM medium or higher) level of risk.

5.5.1 One-Sample t-test
The first step in the analysis was to calculate the one-sample t-test to compare the
observed means for each sample with a hypothetical low score. According to the Risk
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table produced in Table 19, the highest single-respondent score for low-risk scenarios is
six (6). This is the risk score where a respondent would pick either low probability (2)
with important consequences (3) or medium probability (3) with minor consequences (2).
With ISRAM it is possible to get aggregated risk scores that are higher than six (6) but
lower than the next category of medium risk. It was decided to use a score of eight (8) as
the test value since this score represents the lowest value for a score of medium risk in
the final risk table. The results of this analysis are shown in Table 29.

Table 29. One-sample t-test results from SPSS.

Test Value = 8

RiskCon1
RiskCon2
RiskCon3
RiskCon4
RiskExec5
RiskExec6
RiskExec7
RiskExec8
RiskLowCtrl
RiskDUse10
RiskDUse11
RiskDuse12
RiskDuse13

t
7.499
7.799
8.696
5.143
8.019
8.143
6.660
6.033
1.837
8.233
7.719
7.809
9.547

df
64
57
59
56
65
55
57
61
60
63
55
53
60

Significance
One-Sided p Two-Sided
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.036
0.071
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
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Mean
Differen
ce
5.81538
5.58621
7.43333
4.40351
6.34848
7.05357
5.50000
5.09677
1.65574
6.75000
6.53571
6.64815
7.65574

95% Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
Lower Upper
4.2662 7.3646
4.1519 7.0205
5.7228 9.1438
2.6884 6.1186
4.7673 7.9296
5.3177 8.7894
3.8464 7.1536
3.4074 6.7861
-0.1473 3.4588
5.1117 8.3883
4.8389 8.2325
4.9406 8.3557
6.0516 9.2599

The one-sample t-test compared each scenario's sample mean risk score to the
lowest value for the medium-level risk category, or "8", in the ISRAM risk table as the
test value. Each of the scenarios’ sample mean risk scores were greater than the test value
at the 95% confidence level for a one-sided test. This indicated that there is support for
suggesting the population mean for each scenario would be in a range consistent with a
medium level or risk or higher according to the ISRAM method.
One potential problem is the control scenario labeled “RiskLowCtrl” was intended to
represent a low overall risk scenario, with no more than a low probability of occurrence
and minor consequences.
The results however placed it slightly above the lower boundary of the mediumrisk category (9.65 versus 8). This was offset by the control scenario having the lowest
risk scores of all scenarios. The author believed that although the control question might
be calibrated higher than intended, it was still useful as the lowest risk scenario according
to the data received. To further test the hypothesis, it was decided to compare the risk
scores of each respondent for the scenarios with potentially more risk with their scores
for the control scenario
5.5.2 Two-Sample Paired t-test
It was determined that the two-sample paired t-test could be used to compare the
risk score for the control scenario from each respondent with their responses from the
other scenarios. This more granular approach allows us to see whether each respondent
considers the other scenarios relative to the control scenario intended to represent lower
overall cybersecurity risk. The result of this analysis is shown in Table 30.

103

In the paired sample test, each of the non-control scenarios had a sample mean
which exceeded the sample mean of the control scenario by a statistically significant
amount. Since the control scenario’s risk score was at the lower end of the medium-risk
category in ISRAM, it is believed that this further supports the idea that respondents who
considered the scenarios had at least a medium level of risk overall. Because the
scenarios were explicitly matched with project meta-phases, this supports the research
question and allows us to make conclusions about the support for each of the hypotheses.

Table 30. Two sample paired t-test results from SPSS.
Paired Differences

Pair 1
Pair 2
Pair 3
Pair 4
Pair 5
Pair 6
Pair 7
Pair 8
Pair 9
Pair 10
Pair 11
Pair 12

RiskCon1 RiskLowCtrl9
RiskCon2 RiskLowCtrl9
RiskCon3 RiskLowCtrl9
RiskCon4 RiskLowCtrl9
RiskExec5 RiskLowCtrl9
RiskExec6 RiskLowCtrl9
RiskExec7 RiskLowCtrl9
RiskExec8 RiskLowCtrl9
RiskLowCtrl9 RiskDUse10
RiskLowCtrl9 RiskDUse11
RiskLowCtrl9 RiskDuse12
RiskLowCtrl9 RiskDuse13

Significance

Std. Error
OneMean
Sided p Two-Sided p
1.05909
0.001
0.002

Meta-Phase
Conception

Mean
3.43333

Conception

3.78182

1.06448

0.000

0.001

Conception

5.43860

1.15253

0.000

0.000

Conception

2.61111

0.83403

0.001

0.003

Execution

4.68852

1.00695

0.000

0.000

Execution

4.94118

1.20340

0.000

0.000

Execution

3.48148

1.01103

0.001

0.001

Execution

3.31579

0.91908

0.000

0.001

-4.93220

1.02393

0.000

0.000

-3.86275

1.11180

0.001

0.001

-4.96000

1.14961

0.000

0.000

-6.13793

1.06061

0.000

0.000

Deliverable
Use
Deliverable
Use
Deliverable
Use
Deliverable
Use
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5.5.3 Effect Sizes – Cohen’s D
Based on the prior section it was demonstrated that there is a statistically
significant difference between the sample mean of each of the scenarios and the test value
of 8, in the case of the one-sample t-test. To further quantify the size of the differences
observed, SPSS was used to calculate the Cohen’s D as shown in Table 31. All except
three have an effect size large than .80 which is considered a large effect (Glen, 2022).
The only one which is close to a small effect (approx. 0.20) is the control scenario 9
(.235), which was expected to have a low-risk score. The others were above the medium
effect size of 0.50, including Scenario 4 (.681) and Scenario 8 (.766).

Table 31. One sample effect sizes for each scenario using Cohen's D.

Scenario

Cohen’s D
Standardizer Point Estimate

95% Confidence Interval
Lower
Upper

1 – Conception
2 – Conception
3 – Conception
4 – Conception
5 – Execution
6 – Execution
7 – Execution
8 – Execution
9 – Control
10 – Deliverable Use
11 – Deliverable Use
12 – Deliverable Use
13 – Deliverable Use

6.25
5.45
6.62
6.46
6.43
6.48
6.29
6.65
7.04
6.56
6.34
6.26
6.26

0.64
0.70
0.80
0.39
0.69
0.75
0.57
0.48
-0.02
0.72
0.70
0.72
0.89

0.93
1.02
1.12
0.68
0.99
1.09
0.87
0.77
0.24
1.03
1.03
1.06
1.22
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1.22
1.34
1.44
0.97
1.28
1.42
1.17
1.05
0.49
1.33
1.35
1.39
1.55

5.6 Hypothesis Tests
Each of the three hypotheses in Chapter III was tested. For this study,
cybersecurity risk is considered to be present in a meta-phase if at least one scenario is
found to have a medium or higher level of risk according to the ISRAM methodology.
Because each hypothesis considers whether the risk associated with each scenario is
greater than a certain level, single-tailed tests are used. Each hypothesis was tested at the
.05 confidence level. Missing responses were not considered in calculating risk levels.
When attention check questions were incorrectly answered, the respondent’s assessment
of likelihood and consequences for that scenario was also removed and a risk score was
not calculated. The original hypotheses and results are shown in Table 32.

Table 32. Results of hypothesis tests for presence of cybersecurity risk by meta-phase.
Hypothesis
H1. There are risks to project cybersecurity
during the project conception meta-phase
H2. There are risks to project cybersecurity
during the project execution meta-phase
H3. There are risks to project cybersecurity
during the project deliverable use meta-phase

No. of Scenarios
p <= 0.05
4 of 4

Supported?
Yes

4 of 4

Yes

4 of 4

Yes

Each of the hypotheses was supported by both the single sample t-test and the
matched pair t-test at the 95% confidence level. The calculated p-values (see Table 29
and Table 30) for both tests were extremely low, not only for one scenario in each metaphase, but for all meta-phases.
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The results of this study, therefore, suggest an answer to the research question:
according to the respondents, cybersecurity risk is meaningful in all three project metaphases.
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CHAPTER VI
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

This chapter discusses the results of the study and implications for future research. The
first section summarizes how the results of both the lightweight ISRAM method and the
Student’s t-test provide support for hypotheses and ultimately, empirical support for the
research question. The following sections discuss the implications of the study for
academic and practical purposes. Finally, the strengths and limitations of the study are
considered, and also future directions.

6.1 Summary of Results
The research question sought to discover when in the lifespan of a project would
cybersecurity risk become significant. The results indicate that across a project lifespan
covering three temporal meta-phases, cybersecurity risk was present. All three
hypotheses were supported strongly in that risk was present in each of the four scenarios
for the three project meta-phases. All 12 threat scenarios constructed for the practitioner
survey were deemed to illustrate risk above a 'low' threat level. Furthermore, each of the
12 scenarios posed risk greater than that of a control scenario designed to pose little or no
risk.
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6.2 Academic Contributions
This study established a temporal framework for projects and used it to ground
the identification of project cyber assets and threats5. This temporal framework may be
useful in the study of other project-related phenomena as well in that it recommends a
common frame of reference to extend the temporal horizon to consider influencing
factors, conditions, and project outcomes that may impact project stakeholders. This
wider lens may also reveal additional relationships and inform future research constructs.
This study extends the literature associated with project risk management by
enhancing the understanding of cybersecurity risk in the context of project organization
structures. The actions of third parties can expose significant cybersecurity risks, which
offers additional research opportunities. Another key idea that this study suggests is that
key project activities often start is often much earlier than the official project start, which
suggests further research in cybersecurity risk management as part of project readiness
might be useful.
This study also adds to cybersecurity research by considering how cybersecurity
risks affect project activities and change over time. This study also helps extend the
cybersecurity body of knowledge to include unique characteristics of project
organizations. Projects extend the boundaries of an organization's cybersecurity

5

Versions of some sections of this manuscript has been published at the Americas Conference on Information Systems (Presley,
Landry, and Shropshire, 2018a; Presley, Landry, and Shropshire, 2020) and the Southern Association for Information Systems
Conference (Presley and Landry, 2016, Presley and Landry, 2018b).
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landscape to include other participating organizations. This has to potential to affect
future risk-related research efforts where projects are a feature.

6.3 Practical Contributions
This study makes several possible contributions to the practitioner. It may
suggest that earlier consideration of project cybersecurity risks is helpful. It provides
motivation and guidance for additional risk management practices and points out gaps in
the current risk management practices with regard to the unique requirements of
cybersecurity risk.
It is hoped that this understanding will enable better project-related decisions
based on post-project threat realization potential. The results show that a sample of
project management and cybersecurity experts perceive that cyber risk is present across
all three meta-phases. These results identify which project assets are at risk to what types
of threats, and when. These results suggest that attention to the overall cybersecurity
standing of the organization will impact projects which in turn can impact stakeholders
both within and outside of the organization.
This study also informs the need to consider the long-term consequences of
cybersecurity events and decisions which may occur before and during project execution.
Decisions made during the earlier periods can result in cybersecurity risk and negative
outcomes after the project is complete, leading to longer-term harm to the sponsoring
organizations' reputations and stakeholders.
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6.4 Strengths of Study
The use of a cross-sectional survey is indicated by the phenomenon and the goals
of the research. It is expected that the types of assets and risks associated with the project
meta-phases will change over time, perhaps rapidly, but it is unlikely that the presence of
risk in each meta-phase is likely to change. This survey attempts to study the views of a
group of professionals at a point in time, which is sufficient to achieve this goal. The use
of a field study is also a strength, in that it seeks to capture real-world experiences and
insights from working professionals with experience in the field. Using relative values
rather than attempting to calculate specific values also adds to the external validity
through generalizability: actual values would necessarily be highly specific to individual
projects and organizations. This method is also easily reproducible in that it relies on
content and technology that is available to nearly any research team and can be quickly
adapted to targeted assessments for more specific research areas or individual project
assessments.
Another strength of the methodology is that it relies on prior research efforts as a
model for describing extended project lifespan and performing cybersecurity risk analysis
(Whitman, 2003; Whitman & Mattord, 2010). There is also considerable support in the
project management practice literature for risk management throughout the project
lifespan (PMI, 2013; DoD, 2015a; PMI, 2017a) which informed the study models for risk
identification and quantification. Finally, the study used widely cited and reviewed
standards for cybersecurity risk identification (NIST, 2012; Whitman & Mattord, 2016)
and project management standards (PMI, 2017b)
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Finally, the survey was administered to a wide range of professionals using a
company specializing in market research (Qualtrics, 2021a), which enhances the
generalizability of the study. Internal validity was supported through the use of the
control scenario and having an attention check question in each scenario. Face validity
was enhanced through the use of two pilot studies and an expert panel review. Content
validity was considered and addressed using an expert panel review process based on the
literature (Lawshe, 1975)

6.5 Limitations of Study
Limitations of the study include the relative anonymity of study participants.
While Qualtrics made it possible to cast a wider net for possible survey participants, the
system relies heavily on self-reported information for participant selection. Still, it is
expected that the benefits of reaching greater numbers of respondents promptly offset the
potential for greater dishonesty.
Another limitation is that the study uses only a subset of assets and vulnerabilities.
The reason for the decision was to make the survey more manageable for the respondent
and reduce fatigue, thereby improving response rates and quality of responses. This
limitation did not prevent the study from meeting the goals of the study however: risk
was detected in each of the project meta-phases. Future research might consider more
threat asset scenarios, giving a richer view of the threat landscape.
The recruitment and survey delivery mechanism were a paid task organized by a
professional market research company, which means the sample was drawn from a
population subset of cybersecurity and project management professionals who were
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interested in taking surveys for reimbursement. Study participants, therefore, may not be
a completely representative sample of the entire population of managers and
cybersecurity professionals. This study assumed the differences between these groups to
be negligible, but it is unknown whether there are differences between the subset of
professionals willing to take surveys for payment and the general population which might
affect the results of the risk assessment. More study would be needed to test this
assumption.
The use of the carefully chosen panel of experts to review a pilot survey is
believed to somewhat mitigate potential self-selection biases of the anonymous paid
survey. Similar results from prior pilot studies, although lacking the improvements made
to the final study, appear to support the presence of risk factors in each of the metaphases.
The assignment of project assets to meta-phases based on when they were first
used, created, or modified was not as straightforward as originally expected; there was
some disagreement noted among the expert panel and pilot study responses. Future
research could explore this using a more robust content validity approach. To mitigate,
the scenarios were modified to explicitly state the meta-phase, but this could have still
been a source of dissonance if the respondents did not agree with the assignment.
The surveys were completed by most participants very quickly, compared to the
initial estimates by the author, but attention check questions and the automated fraud
detection by the survey company reduced the likelihood of rushed responses and bots
being used to deliver invalid or unhelpful data.
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6.6 Directions for Future Research
Possible directions for future research could involve the investigation of the
detailed risks present in each of the metaphases, particularly the conception meta-phase.
Organizations would potentially benefit from a better understanding of how preparedness
and ongoing risk management through the project conception and project execution metaphases might reduce the likelihood of negative outcomes for the sponsoring organization,
and so an interesting study may be to determine whether organizations that invest heavily
in cybersecurity risk management have fewer negative outcomes on a longitudinal basis.
Survey and delivery tools can be expanded for future research efforts, such as future
action research projects for analyzing specific projects. There may be some potential for
working with US DoD (Army) and private industry partners to look for ways to improve
risk identification, as these rely heavily on project organizations. Finally, further research
into the nature of cybersecurity vulnerabilities during project lifespans may help identify
countermeasures that are useful for reducing risk to sponsoring organizations and
stakeholders.
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Appendix A: IRB Approval Documentation

This section contains a reproduced copy of the IRB approval document. The study
was determined to have an exempt review type and was originally approved by the IRB
board on December 18, 2022. The study was concluded during the approved time.
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Appendix B: Survey Instrument Details

In the following sections, the survey instrument is shown. There were three
overarching logical sections. The first section introduced the survey and contained IRB
disclosure information about benefits, risks, data retention and withdrawal questions. The
second section requested certain demographic data. Two of these questions related to
years of experience in project management and cybersecurity were used to qualify the
subjects. The remaining section showed the respondent a scenario that describes each
Project Asset-Threat combination for a specified project meta-phase, and then asked three
questions. The first questions were an attention check to make sure the respondent read
the question properly. The second question asked for the likelihood of a similar scenario
occurring. The third question asked for the potential impact of a similar scenario.
The survey was delivered using Qualtrics on-line survey capabilities. It is
reproduced here as closely as possible.
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EFFECTIVE CYBERSECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT IN PROJECTS: A
Survey
Steven Scott Presley, MS
C/O Jeffrey Landry, Ph. D.
University of South Alabama School of Computing
150 Student Services Drive, Shelby Hall, Suite 2101
Mobile, AL 36688-0002
Phone: (251) 366-0677
Email: ssp1521@jagmail.southalabama.edu
You are invited to voluntarily participate in a research project. The purpose of this study
is to understand how cybersecurity risks appear and change over time in projects. The
questionnaire is expected to take no longer than thirty (30) minutes to complete.
Participation will remain anonymous and no identifying data will be collected. You have
the right to refuse to answer any questions that you do not wish to complete and/or
answer.
Benefits and Risks:
This study is intended to help researchers and practitioners better understand
cybersecurity risks in projects, and thereby help to better protect projects and deliverables
against these risks. We are not collecting any personally identifiable information about
yourself nor do we seek to collect any potentially sensitive information about the
organizations that you support. For this reason, we believe the risk to you is negligible.
Incentives:
No incentives are provided for participation in this study.
Data Retention and Withdrawal:
All answers will be kept for a maximum of one year after completion of the research after
all data has been collected and the dissertation completed. All information will be used
for research purposes only.
You may withdraw at any time without consequence.
Please contact me at (251) 366-0677 or the Institutional Review Board at the University
of South Alabama at (251) 460-6308 if you have questions about your rights as a research
subject.
If these terms are acceptable, please continue to the next page....
(Page Break)
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Directions
You will be presented with 13 project threat scenarios across three project phases. The
first phase is before the project begins. The second phase is during project execution. The
third phase is during the project deliverable’s deployment or subsequent use. You will be
asked to respond to risk-related questions about each scenario.
You may withdraw at any time.
End of Block: Introduction
Start of Block: Demographic Questions
Gender (optional)
o
Male (1)
o
Female (2)
o
Non-binary / third gender (3)
o
Prefer not to say (4)
Age (optional)
________________________________________________________________
Job Title What best describes your current job title or career focus?
o
Project Manager (1)
o
Cybersecurity Specialist (2)
o
Business Manager (3)
o
Full-time Student (4)
o
Other (5) ________________________________________________
(Page Break)
PM Experience How many years of experience do you have working as a project
manager?
________________________________________________________________
(Page Break)
Cyber Experience How many years of experience do you have working as a
cybersecurity specialist?
________________________________________________________________
(Page Break)
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Education What is the highest level of education you have attained?
o
Some school, no diploma (1)
o
High school graduate or equivalent (2)
o
Some college, no degree (3)
o
Associate's degree (4)
o
Bachelor's (5)
o
Master's degree (6)
o
Professional degree (7)
o
Doctoral degree (8)
(Page Break)
Scenario 1
Consider whether project proposals might be vulnerable to deliberate acts of espionage or
trespass before a project officially begins. The following scenario is an example of how
this might occur:
A movie studio had its email server breached, and subsequently lost project proposals in
the form of movie scripts. The proposals were stolen and made available to the public,
leading to the cancellation of scheduled movie production projects after other film
companies started making competing movies.
Q1.1 According to the text above, when does this scenario occur?
o
Before the project officially begins (1)
o
During the project execution (2)
o
After the project is over (3)
Q1.2 What are the potential consequences to an organization should the above scenario
occur?
o
Not Applicable (1)
o
1 - Negligible Consequences (2)
o
2 - Minor Consequences (3)
o
3 - Important Consequences (4)
o
4 - Serious Consequences (5)
o
5 - Very Serious Consequences (6)
Q1.3 What is the relative probability that a similar scenario could occur?
o
Not Applicable (1)
o
1 - Very Low Probability (2)
o
2 - Low Probability (3)
o
3 - Medium Probability (4)
o
4 - High Probability (5)
o
5 - Very High Probability (6)
(Page Break)
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Scenario 2
Consider whether business strategy information might be vulnerable to deliberate acts of
espionage or trespass before a project officially begins. The following scenario is an
example of how this might occur:
A foreign state-supported manufacturer compromised the server of a major U.S.
competitor obtaining market research reports and strategic forecasts ahead of the U.S.
manufacture’s initiation of a new product development effort. The foreign manufacturer
used these to gain competitive advantages.
Q2.1 According to the text above, when does this scenario occur?
o
Before the project officially begins (1)
o
During the project execution (2)
o
After the project is over (3)
Q2.2 What are the potential consequences to an organization should the above scenario
occur?
o
Not Applicable (1)
o
1 - Negligible Consequences (2)
o
2 - Minor Consequences (3)
o
3 - Important Consequences (4)
o
4 - Serious Consequences (5)
o
5 - Very Serious Consequences (6)
Q2.3 What is the relative probability that a similar scenario could occur?
o
Not Applicable (1)
o
1 - Very Low Probability (2)
o
2 - Low Probability (3)
o
3 - Medium Probability (4)
o
4 - High Probability (5)
o
5 - Very High Probability (6)
(Page Break)

133

Scenario 3
Consider whether project plans might be vulnerable to technical hardware failures or
errors before a project officially begins. The following scenario is an example of how this
might occur:
Because of a previously undiscovered problem with the firmware of a firewall server,
hackers compromise an email server being used by a new products division of the
Department of Defense. The hackers gained access to specifications for proposed new
military products, which they sold to a rival state intelligence agency.
Q3.1 According to the text above, when does this scenario occur?
o
Before the project officially begins (1)
o
During the project execution (2)
o
After the project is over (3)
Q3.2 What are the potential consequences to an organization should the above scenario
occur?
o
Not Applicable (1)
o
1 - Negligible Consequences (2)
o
2 - Minor Consequences (3)
o
3 - Important Consequences (4)
o
4 - Serious Consequences (5)
o
5 - Very Serious Consequences (6)
Q3.3 What is the relative probability that a similar scenario could occur?
o
Not Applicable (1)
o
1 - Very Low Probability (2)
o
2 - Low Probability (3)
o
3 - Medium Probability (4)
o
4 - High Probability (5)
o
5 - Very High Probability (6)
(Page Break)
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Scenario 4
Consider whether the justification for a proposed project might be vulnerable to technical
hardware failures or errors before a project officially begins. The following scenario is an
example of how this might occur:
Extensive resources and costs were put into researching, analyzing, and justifying a new
product line that would, if successful, strengthen the firm's position in the marketplace.
The project sponsor gathered data from several sources, including notes from interviews,
and combined them to create a detailed project justification analysis and report. Due to
the sensitive nature of the project, the report and supporting analysis documents were
stored directly on their laptop, which then suffered a catastrophic hard drive failure. The
justification report and data were irretrievably lost, requiring the sponsor to recreate the
documents from scratch.
Q4.1 According to the text above, when does this scenario occur?
o
Before the project officially begins (1)
o
During the project execution (2)
o
After the project is over (3)
Q4.2 What are the potential consequences to an organization should the above scenario
occur?
o
Not Applicable (1)
o
1 - Negligible Consequences (2)
o
2 - Minor Consequences (3)
o
3 - Important Consequences (4)
o
4 - Serious Consequences (5)
o
5 - Very Serious Consequences (6)
Q4.3 What is the relative probability that a similar scenario could occur?
o
Not Applicable (1)
o
1 - Very Low Probability (2)
o
2 - Low Probability (3)
o
3 - Medium Probability (4)
o
4 - High Probability (5)
o
5 - Very High Probability (6)
(Page Break)
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Scenario 5
Consider whether the technical project infrastructure (e.g. servers, workstations, and
network hardware) might be vulnerable to acts of human error or failure during project
execution. The following scenario is an example of how this might occur:
A retail store employed an outside contractor as part of a project team. The contractor
accidentally installed malware on a project workstation at the store. The malware could
end up compromising the retail store's network, breaching customer data and point-ofsale systems.
Q5.1 According to the text above, when does this scenario occur?
o
Before the project officially begins (1)
o
During the project execution (2)
o
After the project is over (3)
Q5.2 What are the potential consequences to an organization should the above scenario
occur?
o
Not Applicable (1)
o
1 - Negligible Consequences (2)
o
2 - Minor Consequences (3)
o
3 - Important Consequences (4)
o
4 - Serious Consequences (5)
o
5 - Very Serious Consequences (6)
Q5.3 What is the relative probability that a similar scenario could occur?
o
Not Applicable (1)
o
1 - Very Low Probability (2)
o
2 - Low Probability (3)
o
3 - Medium Probability (4)
o
4 - High Probability (5)
o
5 - Very High Probability (6)
(Page Break)
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Scenario 6
Consider whether legacy code might be vulnerable because of technological obsolescence
during project execution. The following scenario is an example of how this might occur:
A defense contractor was awarded a contract to extend legacy code by adding new
functionality. The project team was instructed to re-use old components as much as
possible to reduce costs. The old code contained an unknown vulnerability that made it
unsafe to run on modern platforms. Hackers later exploited this vulnerability to gain
access to the legacy system containing wartime readiness data on military aircraft.
Q6.1 According to the text above, when does this scenario occur?
o
Before the project officially begins (1)
o
During the project execution (2)
o
After the project is over (3)
Q6.2 What are the potential consequences to an organization should the above scenario
occur?
o
Not Applicable (1)
o
1 - Negligible Consequences (2)
o
2 - Minor Consequences (3)
o
3 - Important Consequences (4)
o
4 - Serious Consequences (5)
o
5 - Very Serious Consequences (6)
Q6.3 What is the relative probability that a similar scenario could occur?
o
Not Applicable (1)
o
1 - Very Low Probability (2)
o
2 - Low Probability (3)
o
3 - Medium Probability (4)
o
4 - High Probability (5)
o
5 - Very High Probability (6)
(Page Break)
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Scenario 7
Consider whether work-in-progress hardware and software might be vulnerable to acts of
human error or failure during project execution. The following scenario is an example of
how this might occur:
During the acquisitions phase of a Department of Defense project, microchips acquired
from a supplier were not properly inspected during the quality assurance process. Faulty
chips made it into multiple missile systems which were then deployed into the field. If
detected in the field, all the faulty chips would have to be replaced by first bringing the
missiles back into the production environment at a prohibitive cost.
Q7.1 According to the text above, when does this scenario occur?
o
Before the project officially begins (1)
o
During the project execution (2)
o
After the project is over (3)
Q7.2 What are the potential consequences to an organization should the above scenario
occur?
o
Not Applicable (1)
o
1 - Negligible Consequences (2)
o
2 - Minor Consequences (3)
o
3 - Important Consequences (4)
o
4 - Serious Consequences (5)
o
5 - Very Serious Consequences (6)
Q7.3 What is the relative probability that a similar scenario could occur?
o
Not Applicable (1)
o
1 - Very Low Probability (2)
o
2 - Low Probability (3)
o
3 - Medium Probability (4)
o
4 - High Probability (5)
o
5 - Very High Probability (6)
(Page Break)

138

Scenario 8
Consider whether legacy databases might be vulnerable to deliberate acts of espionage or
trespass during project execution. The following scenario is an example of how this
might occur:
A team of student interns worked on a project to construct a student success dashboard to
be integrated with a legacy database of student information. The interns were given
access to database, containing the personally identifiable information of students. Such
access by unauthorized parties such as interns violated federal privacy laws protecting
student information, and made the university potentially subject to litigation and fines.
Q8.1 According to the text above, when does this scenario occur?
o
Before the project officially begins (1)
o
During the project execution (2)
o
After the project is over (3)
Q8.2 What are the potential consequences to an organization should the above scenario
occur?
o
Not Applicable (1)
o
1 - Negligible Consequences (2)
o
2 - Minor Consequences (3)
o
3 - Important Consequences (4)
o
4 - Serious Consequences (5)
o
5 - Very Serious Consequences (6)
Q8.3 What is the relative probability that a similar scenario could occur?
o
Not Applicable (1)
o
1 - Very Low Probability (2)
o
2 - Low Probability (3)
o
3 - Medium Probability (4)
o
4 - High Probability (5)
o
5 - Very High Probability (6)
(Page Break)
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Scenario 9
Consider whether technical project infrastructure might be vulnerable to acts of human
error or failures at any point before, during, or after a project. The following scenario is
an example of how this might occur:
A hard drive failed due to the spilling of a diet soda. The freak accident required that a
project server be repaired. After backups were restored, the team had not lost any of its
work, and the sprint was not delayed.
Q9.1 According to the text above, when does this scenario occur?
o
Before the project officially begins (1)
o
During the project execution (2)
o
After the project is over (3)
o
At any point before, during, or after a project (4)
Q9.2 What are the potential consequences to an organization should the above scenario
occur?
o
Not Applicable (1)
o
1 - Negligible Consequences (2)
o
2 - Minor Consequences (3)
o
3 - Important Consequences (4)
o
4 - Serious Consequences (5)
o
5 - Very Serious Consequences (6)
Q9.3 What is the relative probability that a similar scenario could occur?
o
Not Applicable (1)
o
1 - Very Low Probability (2)
o
2 - Low Probability (3)
o
3 - Medium Probability (4)
o
4 - High Probability (5)
o
5 - Very High Probability (6)
(Page Break)
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Scenario 10
Consider whether operational employees might be vulnerable to deliberate acts of
espionage or trespass during the useful life of the project deliverables after the project is
over. The following scenario is an example of how this might occur:
Malicious actors used social engineering techniques to compromise the employees of a
third-party vendor. The vendor had provided services on a system installed after a
recently completed project. The hackers stole credentials that allowed them to gain access
to the host organization's deployed production system.
Q10.1 According to the text above, when does this scenario occur?
o
Before the project officially begins (1)
o
During the project execution (2)
o
After the project is over (3)
Q10.2 What are the potential consequences to an organization should the above scenario
occur?
o
Not Applicable (1)
o
1 - Negligible Consequences (2)
o
2 - Minor Consequences (3)
o
3 - Important Consequences (4)
o
4 - Serious Consequences (5)
o
5 - Very Serious Consequences (6)
Q10.3 What is the relative probability that a similar scenario could occur?
o
Not Applicable (1)
o
1 - Very Low Probability (2)
o
2 - Low Probability (3)
o
3 - Medium Probability (4)
o
4 - High Probability (5)
o
5 - Very High Probability (6)
(Page Break)
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Scenario 11
Consider whether a system deployment process might be vulnerable to acts of human
error or failure during the useful life of the project deliverables after the project is over.
The following scenario is an example of how this might occur:
A project team working for a large international hotel chain completed the development
of a new system for managing reservations. They decided to use a phased approach
where they deployed the new system to only one subsidiary hotel brand at a time. The
other brands not yet deployed would continue to use the old system until it was their turn
to deploy. It was thought this approach would reduce the overall risks associated with a
"big-bang" update of all subsidiaries at once. The IT system update process, however, did
not account for a lengthy phased rollout plan, and important new security
countermeasures were not added until the very end. As a result, several servers were left
unprotected for several months and were exploited by hackers.
Q11.1 According to the text above, when does this scenario occur?
o
Before the project officially begins (1)
o
During the project execution (2)
o
After the project is over (3)
Q11.2 What are the potential consequences to an organization should the above scenario
occur?
o
Not Applicable (1)
o
1 - Negligible Consequences (2)
o
2 - Minor Consequences (3)
o
3 - Important Consequences (4)
o
4 - Serious Consequences (5)
o
5 - Very Serious Consequences (6)
Q11.3 What is the relative probability that a similar scenario could occur?
o
Not Applicable (1)
o
1 - Very Low Probability (2)
o
2 - Low Probability (3)
o
3 - Medium Probability (4)
o
4 - High Probability (5)
o
5 - Very High Probability (6)
(Page Break)
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Scenario 12
Consider whether a working system that was created by a project team might be
vulnerable to acts of human error or failure during the useful life of the system after the
project is over. The following scenario is an example of how this might occur:
A financial institution deployed a completed and tested customer information system to a
live server. The deployment plan included a significant period of time between when the
working system was deployed and when network security protecting the system was fully
applied. During this time period, the system was not fully protected, and hackers were
able to access the server and install malicious software.
Q12.1 According to the text above, when does this scenario occur?
o
Before the project officially begins (1)
o
During the project execution (2)
o
After the project is over (3)
Q12.2 What are the potential consequences to an organization should the above scenario
occur?
o
Not Applicable (1)
o
1 - Negligible Consequences (2)
o
2 - Minor Consequences (3)
o
3 - Important Consequences (4)
o
4 - Serious Consequences (5)
o
5 - Very Serious Consequences (6)
Q12.3 What is the relative probability that a similar scenario could occur?
o
Not Applicable (1)
o
1 - Very Low Probability (2)
o
2 - Low Probability (3)
o
3 - Medium Probability (4)
o
4 - High Probability (5)
o
5 - Very High Probability (6)
(Page Break)
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Scenario 13
Consider whether a working system that was created by a project team might be
vulnerable to technological obsolescence during the useful life of the system after the
project is over. The following scenario is an example of how this might occur:
A commercial software maker came out with a new version of its email app, and it
became widely adopted. After five years, it ceased offering updates and patches to that
version. Several large government agencies failed to update to the newer version. They
kept using the now obsolete version, which ended up being hacked with malware
affecting thousands of government employees.
Q13.1 According to the text above, when does this scenario occur?
o
Before the project officially begins (1)
o
During the project execution (2)
o
After the project is over (3)
Q13.2 What are the potential consequences to an organization should the above scenario
occur?
o
Not Applicable (1)
o
1 - Negligible Consequences (2)
o
2 - Minor Consequences (3)
o
3 - Important Consequences (4)
o
4 - Serious Consequences (5)
o
5 - Very Serious Consequences (6)
Q13.3 What is the relative probability that a similar scenario could occur?
o
Not Applicable (1)
o
1 - Very Low Probability (2)
o
2 - Low Probability (3)
o
3 - Medium Probability (4)
o
4 - High Probability (5)
o
5 - Very High Probability (6)
(Page Break)
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Thank You!
The survey is now complete.
Thank you for your participation in this effort. For further questions or comments, please
contact:
Steven Scott Presley
University of South Alabama
School of Computing
ssp1521@jagmail.southalabama.edu
Press the next arrow below to finalize the survey. Note: once finalized, you will not be
able to return to the survey.
(End of Survey)
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Appendix C: Project Asset Value by Project Meta-Phase

In the following tables, the original list of 26 assets is presented along with value
statements created by the researcher and advisors to explain why project assets were
important to project team, overall project success, and the ability of the sponsoring
organizations to achieve the expected value from the project deliverables.

Table A1. Project assets found in the conception meta-phase.
Asset

Description

Project Idea

Initial idea for a project, such as a Valuable because of IP value, cost
presentation, document, or email of developing, potential for
that describes an organizational
revenue impact
need and the possible projectdelivered solution
Requirements, high level plan
Valuable because of IP value, cost
of developing, potential for
revenue impact
MOVs, identified need
Valuable because of IP value, cost
descriptions, strategy, costs,
of developing, potential for
NPV, ROI, Expected Market
revenue impact
Value
Technical study, market test
Valuable because of IP value, cost
results, know-how related to the
of developing, potential for
project proposal
revenue impact
Identity and security of the
Valuable because of need to secure
potential PM, Program Manager, project assets; project can provide
Sponsors of the project being
vector for the unauthorized release
considered
of information
Confidential strategy or process
Valuable because of need to
information not released to the
protect internal motivations,
general public, which relates to
strategies, and processes from
(or is indicated by) the project
unauthorized disclosure - potential
proposal
source of risk

Project
Proposal
Project
Justification
Feasibility
Study
Organization
Management
Business
Strategy
Information

Asset Value
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Table A2. Project assets found in the execution meta-phase.
Asset
Legacy
Database

Description
Databases (both the DBMS and
actual information) that pre-exists
the project, and serves as an input
or reference for the project team in
the production of project
deliverables

Asset Value
Contains Sensitive information,
business value, sensitive data that
could impact physical security,
hurt people.

Source code of software that was
produced by the sponsoring
organization which will be used as
an input or refrence for the project
team in the production of project
deliverables.
Project
Documents related to planning
Requirements project execution processes.
Examples include the initial
project scope description, financial
planning information, stakeholder
identification and priorities,
project charter, and scope
documentation.
Project
Includes ongoing project
Management communications to stakeholders,
Artifacts
including the project schedule,
risk register updates, and status
reports

Valuable because it is expensive
IP, and also is a vector for
malware, backdoors, and
intentional sabotage. If destroyed,
very costly to replace

Legacy Code

Project
Technical
Infrastructure
Work in
process
(“WIP”)
Software for
Project

Includes all IT assets used by the
project team members to perform
the project activities
Includes software, database
schema, queries and libraries that
are required to produce the project
deliverable, or that make up part
or all of the project deliverable
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Valuable because these documents
contain sensitive information
about the project and the
participating organizations that
may normally not be disclosed.
Costly to produce, and if
destroyed, very costly to re-create.
Valuable because these documents
contain sensitive information
about the project and the
participating organizations that
may normally not be disclosed.
May be costly to replace if
destroyed
Critical for many (or most) project
activities. May house the
deliverables of certain projects.
Can be a key component of the
deliverable for certain projects,
and the entire deliverable for other
projects

Table A2. cont.
Asset
WIP
Hardware for
Project

Project Team
- Business
Stakeholders

Project Team
- Engineering
and
Development
Team
Project Team
–
Management
Personnel

Description
Includes all hardware design
information and prototypes being
created by the project team in
support of the project deliverable.
May include the selection of
components and suppliers upon
which deliverable designs are
based. Includes information
typically stored in Product Design
Management and Product
Lifecycle Management systems
(PDM and PLM respectively)
Personnel who are participating in
the project activities, whether as
primary participants or in a
supporting role.

Project personnel who are directly
responsible for the design,
production, and implementation of
the project deliverables. May
include engineers, testers, and
marketing (for product definition)
Project and Organization
Management who are responsible
for resource allocation, decision
making, communication, and
facilitation of daily activities
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Asset Value
Can be a key component of the
deliverable for certain projects,
and the entire deliverable for other
projects

Valuable human resources who are
key to determining requirements
and acceptability of project
deliverables. Also validate results
of project. May include Business
Users, SMEs, Consultants, Product
Owners
Valuable human resources who
possess the Knowledge, Skills, and
experience that are vital for project
success.
Valuable human resources who
possess the Knowledge, Skills, and
experience that are vital for project
success. Possess the history and
continuity to facilitate decision
making and risk management

Table A2. cont.
Asset
Project Team
- Third Party
Vendors /
Consultants

Description
Suppliers and consultants who
provide valuable goods,
information, hardware, software,
and services that are critical to the
success of the project and
facilitate project deliverables.

Project
Deployment
Process

Methods and processes which are
used to promote the project
deliverable to the operations,
manufacturing, or services stage.
This typically occurs at the
conclusion of the project and
represents the transfer of the
deliverables to the regular
operations of the sponsoring
organization. May also include
ongoing processes, however, in
long-running projects (e.g. Dev
Ops)
Methods and processes to move
critical project data (including
customer and legacy data that is
impacted by the project) from one
location to another. Examples
would include resting locations for
data during a migration effort,
Network Attached Storage
devices, and data used for
technical purposes such as design
or troubleshooting of issues
Mobile assets which are used by
project team members for
conducting project activities
which support the creation of
project deliverables. Examples
include smart phones, tablets, and
portable laptop computers

Project Data
Exchange
and Storage
Processes

Project Team
Mobile
Assets

149

Asset Value
Valuable organizations who
support and enable the realization
of project goals and objectives.
Often possess unique knowledge
and capabilities that the host
organization doesn’t possess
internally or cannot easily recreate.
Critical for the successful delivery
of project deliverables, and by
extension, for the sponsoring
organization to achieve the
benefits expected from the project.

Processes for transferring data are
often necessary to support project
activities, including, for example,
the migration to a new database
system.

Critical for performing most
project activities requiring regular
communications between team
members, suppliers, and
management. Store information
related to the project deliverables
and processes.

Table A3. Project assets found in the deliverable use meta-phase.
Asset
Products with
Cyber
Component
Information
System in
Use
Operational
Employee

Process for
Updates

Project
deployment
process
including
ongoing
product
updates,
Agile-type
releases, and
“DevOps”
scenarios.

Description
Manufactured Items with cyber
component that were the result of
designs produced by the project
Live production information
system that was developed,
deployed, or modified during the
project execution phase
Employees of the sponsoring
organization who are responsible
for using the project deliverables.
This could include users of an
information system created by the
project, and manufacturing
employees who product a project
that was designed by the project.
Includes all efforts that are
required for future updates to the
project deliverable. Examples
include system or product updates,
recalls, warranty repairs, and
ongoing maintenance
Methods and processes which are
used to promote the project
deliverable to the operations,
manufacturing, or services stage.
This typically occurs at the
conclusion of the project and
represents the transfer of the
deliverables to the regular
operations of the sponsoring
organization. May also include
ongoing processes, however, in
long-running projects (e.g. Agile
projects and DevOps)
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Asset Value
The safety and reliability of
product deliverables is a key
desired outcome for most projects.
The safety and reliability of
product deliverables is a key
desired outcome for most projects.
Employees are key assets to all
organizations – their safety and
efficiency is valuable to the
organization.

These processes ensure that the
consumers of product deliverables
continue to benefit without being
subjected to unnecessary risks or
harm.
Critical for the successful delivery
of project deliverables, and by
extension, for the sponsoring
organization to achieve the
benefits expected from the project.
Final proof that the product or
service is viable, useful. Often
leads to revenue. Can be
embarrassing if compromised, and
failures can lead to security
breaches.

Appendix D: Asset to Threat Category Mapping by Meta-Phase

For each of the project assets identified in the study, the following Threat Categories
(Whitman and Mattord, 2003) were identified during the study.
Asset: Project idea (Conception Meta-phase)
•
Compromises to Intellectual Property
•
Deliberate Acts of Espionage or Trespass
•
Acts of Human Error or Failure
•
Deliberate Acts of Sabotage or Vandalism
•
Deliberate Acts of Theft
Asset: Proposal (Conception Meta-phase)
•
Compromises to Intellectual Property
•
Deliberate Acts of Espionage or Trespass (Selected, Scenario 1)
•
Deliberate Acts of Sabotage or Vandalism
•
Deliberate Acts of Theft
Asset: Justification (Conception Meta-phase)
•
Compromises to Intellectual Property
•
Deliberate Acts of Espionage or Trespass
•
Deliberate Acts of Sabotage or Vandalism
•
Deliberate Acts of Theft
•
Technical hardware failures or errors (Selected, Scenario 4)
Asset: Feasibility study (Conception Meta-phase)
•
Compromises to Intellectual Property
•
Deliberate Acts of Espionage or Trespass
•
Deliberate Acts of Sabotage or Vandalism
•
Deliberate Acts of Theft
Asset: Business strategy information (Conception Meta-phase)
•
Compromises to Intellectual Property
•
Deliberate Acts of Espionage or Trespass (Selected for Survey – Scenario 2)
•
Deliberate Acts of Sabotage or Vandalism
•
Deliberate Acts of Theft
Asset: Management personnel (Conception Meta-phase)
•
Deliberate Acts of Espionage or Trespass
•
Deliberate Acts of Information Extortion
•
Deliberate Acts of Theft
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Asset: Project plans (Conception Meta-phase)
•
Compromises to Intellectual Property
•
Deliberate Acts of Espionage or Trespass
•
Deliberate Acts of Sabotage or Vandalism
•
Deliberate Acts of Theft
•
Technical Hardware Failures or Errors (Selected for Survey – Scenario 3)
Asset: Product requirements (Execution Meta-phase)
•
Compromises to Intellectual Property
•
Deliberate Acts of Espionage or Trespass
•
Deliberate Acts of Sabotage or Vandalism
•
Deliberate Acts of Theft
Asset: Project plans (Execution Meta-phase)
•
Compromises to Intellectual Property
•
Deliberate Acts of Espionage or Trespass
•
Deliberate Acts of Sabotage or Vandalism
•
Deliberate Acts of Theft
•
Technical Hardware Failures or Errors
Asset: Legacy database (Execution Meta-phase)
•
Deliberate Acts of Sabotage or Vandalism
•
Deliberate Acts of Espionage or Trespass (Selected for Survey – Scenario 8)
•
Deliberate Software Attacks
Asset: Legacy code (Execution Meta-phase)
•
Deliberate Acts of Sabotage or Vandalism
•
Deliberate Software Attacks
•
Technical Software Failures or Errors
•
Technological Obsolescence (Selected for Survey – Scenario 6)
Asset: Project management artifacts (Execution Meta-phase)
•
Deliberate Acts of Espionage or Trespass
•
Deliberate Acts of Information Extortion
•
Deliberate Acts of Theft
Asset: Technical project infrastructure (Execution Meta-phase)
•
Act of Human Error or Failure (Selected for Survey – Scenarios 5 and 9-control)
•
Deliberate Acts of Sabotage or Vandalism
•
Deliberate Software Attacks
•
Forces of Nature
•
Quality of Service Deviations from Service Providers
•
Technical Hardware Failures or Errors
•
Technical Software Failures or Errors
•
Technological Obsolescence
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Asset: Work-in-process hardware and software (Execution Meta-phase)
•
Act of Human Error or Failure (Selected for Survey – Scenario 7)
•
Deliberate Acts of Sabotage or Vandalism
•
Deliberate Software Attacks
•
Forces of Nature
•
Technical Hardware Failures or Errors
•
Technical Software Failures or Errors
Asset: Project team (Execution Meta-phase)
•
Deliberate Acts of Espionage or Trespass
•
Deliberate Acts of Information Extortion
•
Compromises to Intellectual property
•
Deliberate Acts of Theft
•
Forces of Nature
Asset: Project stakeholders (Execution Meta-phase)
•
Deliberate Acts of Espionage or Trespass
•
Deliberate Acts of Information Extortion
•
Deliberate Acts of Theft
•
Forces of Nature
Asset: Third-party vendors and consultants (Execution Meta-phase)
•
Deliberate Acts of Espionage or Trespass
•
Deliberate Acts of Information Extortion
•
Deliberate Acts of Theft
•
Forces of Nature
Asset: Project sponsors (Execution Meta-phase)
•
Deliberate Acts of Espionage or Trespass
•
Deliberate Acts of Information Extortion
•
Deliberate Acts of Theft
•
Forces of Nature
Asset: Project data exchange and storage processes (Execution Meta-phase)
•
Act of Human Error or Failure
•
Deliberate Acts of Sabotage or Vandalism
•
Deliberate Software Attacks
•
Forces of Nature
•
Technical Hardware Failures or Errors
•
Technical Software Failures or Errors
Asset: Project team mobile assets (Execution Meta-phase)
•
Act of Human Error or Failure
•
Deliberate Acts of Sabotage or Vandalism
•
Deliberate Software Attacks
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•
•
•
•

Quality of Service Deviations from Service Providers
Technical Hardware Failures or Errors
Technical Software Failures or Errors
Technological Obsolescence

Asset: Deployment process (Deliverable Use Meta-phase)
•
Act of Human Error or Failure (Selected for Survey – Scenario 11)
•
Deliberate Acts of Sabotage or Vandalism
•
Deliberate Software Attacks
•
Forces of Nature
•
Technical Hardware Failures or Errors
•
Technical Software Failures or Errors
Asset: Deployment team (Deliverable Use Meta-phase)
•
Deliberate Acts of Espionage or Trespass
•
Deliberate Acts of Information Extortion
•
Deliberate Acts of Theft
•
Forces of Nature
Asset: embedded cyber components (Deliverable Use Meta-phase)
•
Acts of Human Error or Failure
•
Deliberate Acts of Sabotage or Vandalism
•
Deliberate Software Attacks
•
Forces of Nature
•
Technical Hardware Failures or Errors
•
Technical Software Failures or Errors
•
Technological Obsolescence
Asset: Working system (Deliverable Use Meta-phase)
•
Acts of Human Error or Failure (Selected for Survey – Scenario 12)
•
Deliberate Acts of Sabotage or Vandalism
•
Deliberate Software Attacks
•
Forces of Nature
•
Technical Hardware Failures or Errors
•
Technical Software Failures or Errors
•
Technological Obsolescence (Selected for Survey – Scenario 13)
Asset: Operational employees (Deliverable Use Meta-phase)
•
Deliberate Acts of Espionage or Trespass (Selected for Survey – Scenario 10)
•
Deliberate Acts of Information Extortion
•
Deliberate Acts of Theft
•
Forces of Nature
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Asset: Update process (Deliverable Use Meta-phase)
•
Act of Human Error or Failure
•
Deliberate Acts of Sabotage or Vandalism
•
Deliberate Software Attacks
•
Forces of Nature
•
Technical Hardware Failures or Errors
•
Technical Software Failures or Errors
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Appendix E: Project Asset and Threat Category Pairs by Scenario

In the following section, the evolution of the scenarios is shown. The tables in this
section show all assets that were originally identified by the research team as being useful
to project teams and being potentially vulnerable to cybersecurity threats. Each of the
assets was assigned to a project meta-phase according to when the assets are first used or
created. Scenarios were then written to better illustrate how each of the project assets
might be vulnerable to cybersecurity threat categories. This is documented in the first two
columns of the table.
The first pilot study included 18 scenarios with unique Project Asset-Threat
Category pairs as shown in the column labeled “Pilot Scenario No.”. The list of scenarios
was further refined based on the results of the Pilot study, subsequent reviews, and the
final expert panel review. The final survey was thereby reduced to 12 scenarios to reduce
the time required to complete the survey by limiting the scenarios to the ones that expert
reviewers believed to be most likely to generate meaningful indications of risk.
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Table A4. Assets and threat category pairs: conception meta-phase.
Asset
Project idea
Proposal
Justification
Feasibility study
Business strategy
information
Management personnel
Product requirements
Project plans

Threat Category
acts of human error or
failure
deliberate acts of
espionage or trespass
Technical hardware
failures or errors
deliberate acts of theft
deliberate acts of
espionage or trespass
not used
not used
Technical hardware
failures or errors

Pilot Scenario
18

Final Scenario
N/A

1

1

N/A

4

14
8

N/A
2

N/A
N/A
N/A

N/A
N/A
3

Table A5. Assets and threat category pairs: execution meta-phase.
Asset
Legacy database
Legacy code
Project management
artifacts
Technical project
infrastructure
Work-in-process
hardware and software
Project team
Project stakeholders
Third-party vendors
and consultants
Project sponsors
Project data exchange
and storage processes
Project team mobile
assets

Threat Category
deliberate acts of
espionage or trespass
technological
obsolescence
not used

Pilot Scenario
5

Final Scenario
8

6

6

N/A

N/A

4
2

5, 9 (as
control)
7

7

N/A

10

N/A

acts of human error or
failure
acts of human error or
failure
compromises to
intellectual property
deliberate acts of
espionage or trespass
deliberate acts of
information extortion
not used

9

N/A

N/A

N/A

not used

N/A

N/A

acts of human error or
failure

16

N/A
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Table A6. Asset and threat category pairs: deliverable use meta-phase.
Asset
Deployment process
Deployment team
Embedded cyber
components
Working system
Working system
Working system
Operational employees
Update process

Threat Category
acts of human error or
failure
not used

Pilot Scenario
12

Final Scenario
11

N/A

N/A

deliberate acts of
sabotage or vandalism;
acts of human error or
failure
deliberate software
attacks
Acts of human error or
failure
Technological
obsolescence
deliberate acts of
espionage or trespass
acts of human error or
failure

13,15

N/A

3

N/A

N/A

12

N/A

13

11

10

17

N/A
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Appendix F: SPSS Scripts for Data Recoding and t-tests

The following lines are captured from the IBM SPSS Statistics Data Editor. Part
A of this script was used to transform the raw data received from the Qualtrics survey
tool into the operationalized variables for the study. Part B was used to generate the
descriptive statistics for the sample survey data. Finally, Part C was used to generate the
t-test results used for testing the hypothesis.
Part A – Data Transformation
RECODE Q1.1 Q2.1 Q3.1 Q4.1 Q5.1 Q6.1 Q7.1 Q8.1 Q9.1 Q10.1 Q11.1 Q12.1 Q13.1 (1
thru 4=Copy) INTO Metaphase1 Metaphase2 Metaphase3 Metaphase4 Metaphase5
Metaphase6 Metaphase7 Metaphase8 Metaphase9 Metaphase10 Metaphase11
Metaphase12 Metaphase13.
EXECUTE.
RECODE Q1.2 Q2.2 Q3.2 Q4.2 Q5.2 Q6.2 Q7.2 Q8.2 Q9.2 Q10.2 Q11.2 Q12.2 Q13.2
(1=0) (2=1) (3=2) (4=3)
(5=4) (6=5) INTO Consequence1 Consequence2 Consequence3 Consequence4
Consequence5 Consequence6 Consequence7 Consequence8 Consequence9
Consequence10 Consequence11 Consequence12 Consequence13.
EXECUTE.
RECODE Consequence1 Consequence2 Consequence3 Consequence4 Consequence5
Consequence6 Consequence7 Consequence8 Consequence9 Consequence10
Consequence11 Consequence12 Consequence13 (0=SYSMIS).
EXECUTE.
RECODE Q1.3 Q2.3 Q3.3 Q4.3 Q5.3 Q6.3 Q7.3 Q8.3 Q9.3 Q10.3 Q11.3 Q12.3 Q13.3
(1=0) (2=1) (3=2) (4=3)
(5=4) (6=5) INTO Probability1 Probability2 Probability3 Probability4 Probability5
Probability6 Probability7 Probability8 Probability9 Probability10 Probability11
Probability12 Probability13.
EXECUTE.
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RECODE Probability1 Probability2 Probability3 Probability4 Probability5 Probability6
Probability7 Probability8 Probability9 Probability10 Probability11 Probability12
Probability13 (0=SYSMIS).
EXECUTE.
DO IF (Metaphase1 ~= 1).
RECODE Consequence1 Probability1 (Lowest thru 5=SYSMIS).
END IF.
DO IF (Metaphase2 ~= 1).
RECODE Consequence2 Probability2 (Lowest thru 5=SYSMIS).
END IF.
DO IF (Metaphase3 ~= 1).
RECODE Consequence3 Probability3 (Lowest thru 5=SYSMIS).
END IF.
DO IF (Metaphase4 ~= 1).
RECODE Consequence4 Probability4 (Lowest thru 5=SYSMIS).
END IF.
DO IF (Metaphase5 ~= 2).
RECODE Consequence5 Probability5 (Lowest thru 5=SYSMIS).
END IF.
DO IF (Metaphase6 ~= 2).
RECODE Consequence6 Probability6 (Lowest thru 5=SYSMIS).
END IF.
DO IF (Metaphase7 ~= 2).
RECODE Consequence7 Probability7 (Lowest thru 5=SYSMIS).
END IF.
DO IF (Metaphase8 ~= 2).
RECODE Consequence8 Probability8 (Lowest thru 5=SYSMIS).
END IF.
DO IF (Metaphase10 ~= 3).
RECODE Consequence10 Probability10 (Lowest thru 5=SYSMIS).
END IF.
DO IF (Metaphase11 ~= 3).
RECODE Consequence11 Probability11 (Lowest thru 5=SYSMIS).
END IF.
DO IF (Metaphase12 ~= 3).
RECODE Consequence12 Probability12 (Lowest thru 5=SYSMIS).
END IF.
DO IF (Metaphase13 ~= 3).
RECODE Consequence13 Probability13 (Lowest thru 5=SYSMIS).
END IF.
EXECUTE.
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DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet2.
COMPUTE RiskCon1=Probability1 * Consequence1.
COMPUTE RiskCon2=Probability2 * Consequence2.
COMPUTE RiskCon3=Probability3 * Consequence3.
COMPUTE RiskCon4=Probability4 * Consequence4.
COMPUTE RiskExec5=Probability5 * Consequence5.
COMPUTE RiskExec6=Probability6 * Consequence6.
COMPUTE RiskExec7=Probability7 * Consequence7.
COMPUTE RiskExec8=Probability8 * Consequence8.
COMPUTE RiskLowCtrl9=Probability9 * Consequence9.
COMPUTE RiskDUse10=Probability10 * Consequence10.
COMPUTE RiskDUse11=Probability11 * Consequence11.
COMPUTE RiskDuse12=Probability12 * Consequence12.
COMPUTE RiskDuse13=Probability13 * Consequence13.
EXECUTE.
Part B – Descriptive Statistics
FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=Gender Education
/ORDER=ANALYSIS.
DESCRIPTIVES VARIABLES=Age PMExperience CyberExperience Durationinseconds
/STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX.
DESCRIPTIVES VARIABLES=Probability1 Probability2 Probability3 Probability4
Probability5 Probability6 Probability7 Probability8 Probability10 Probability11
Probability12 Probability13 Probability9
/STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX.
DESCRIPTIVES VARIABLES=Consequence1 Consequence2 Consequence3
Consequence4 Consequence5 Consequence6 Consequence7 Consequence8
Consequence10 Consequence11 Consequence12 Consequence13 Consequence9
/STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX.
DESCRIPTIVES VARIABLES=RiskCon1 RiskCon2 RiskCon3 RiskCon4 RiskExec5
RiskExec6 RiskExec7 RiskExec8 RiskDUse10 RiskDUse11 RiskDuse12 RiskDuse13
RiskLowCtrl9
/STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX.
DESCRIPTIVES VARIABLES=RiskCon1 RiskCon2 RiskCon3 RiskCon4 RiskExec5
RiskExec6 RiskExec7 RiskExec8 RiskLowCtrl9 RiskDUse10 RiskDUse11 RiskDuse12
RiskDuse13
/STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX
/SORT=MEAN (D).
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Part C – t-test

T-TEST
/TESTVAL=8
/MISSING=ANALYSIS
/VARIABLES=RiskCon1 RiskCon2 RiskCon3 RiskCon4 RiskExec5 RiskExec6 RiskExec7
RiskExec8 RiskLowCtrl9 RiskDUse10 RiskDUse11 RiskDuse12 RiskDuse13
/ES DISPLAY(TRUE)
/CRITERIA=CI(.95).
T-TEST PAIRS=RiskCon1 RiskCon2 RiskCon3 RiskCon4 RiskExec5 RiskExec6
RiskExec7 RiskExec8
RiskLowCtrl9 RiskLowCtrl9 RiskLowCtrl9 RiskLowCtrl9 WITH RiskLowCtrl9
RiskLowCtrl9 RiskLowCtrl9 RiskLowCtrl9 RiskLowCtrl9 RiskLowCtrl9 RiskLowCtrl9
RiskLowCtrl9 RiskDUse10 RiskDUse11 RiskDuse12 RiskDuse13 (PAIRED)
/ES DISPLAY(TRUE) STANDARDIZER(SD)
/CRITERIA=CI(.9500)
/MISSING=ANALYSIS.
T-TEST
/TESTVAL=3
/MISSING=ANALYSIS
/VARIABLES=Consequence1 Probability1 Consequence2 Probability2 Consequence3
Probability3 Consequence4 Probability4 Consequence5 Probability5 Consequence6
Probability6 Consequence7 Probability7 Consequence8 Probability8 Consequence9
Probability9 Consequence10 Probability10 Consequence11 Probability11
Consequence12 Probability12 Consequence13 Probability13
/ES DISPLAY(TRUE)
/CRITERIA=CI(.95).
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